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Abstract—Owing to the massive growth in the storage demands of big data, Cloud Storage Systems (CSSs) have been put forward to
improve the storage capacity. Compare with traditional storage systems, CSSs have lots of advantages, such as higher capacity, lower
cost, and easier scalability. However, they suffer from the main shortcoming of high complexity. To ensure the reliability of CSSs, the
correctness of management programs should be proven. Therefore, a verification framework based on Separation Logic (SL) is
proposed to prove the correctness of management programs in Block-based Cloud Storage Systems (BCSSs), which is the most
popular CSSs. The main contributions are as follows. (1) Two-tier heap structure is constructed as the type of storage units in BCSSs.
All the operations to BCSSs are based on the structure. (2) Assertion pairs are defined to describe the properties for the two-tier
structure. The fact that the two components of a pair effect each other leads lots of interesting properties. (3) A proof system with
Hoare-style specification rules is proposed to reason about the BCSSs. The results show that the correctness of BCSSs can be
verified precisely and flexibly.
Index Terms—Separation Logic, Hoare Logic, Block-based Cloud Storage Systems, Deduction, Formal Verification.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
W ITH the rapid growth of data, the capacity of tra-ditional storage devices could not meet the great
demands. The Cloud Storage Systems (CSSs) have been put
forward to improve the storage capacity [9]. According to
the data types stored, CSSs are divided into three categories:
Block-based CSSs (BCSSs), Object-based CSSs, and File-
based CSSs. Among these CSSs, BCSSs have the lowest
cost and are the easiest to scale, hence BCSSs are the most
popular systems used in CSSs at present.
In BCSSs, data are stored in the block-based storage
structure, which means that the resources in BCSSs consist
of small block spaces. When user submit their data file to
a BCSS, the system would cut the file into some segments,
and then take those segments into property blocks. Using
Hadoop distribeted file system (HDFS) [23] as an example,
uploaded file is divided into lots of 128MB segments firstly.
Then the system allocates those segments to a sequence of
blocks one by one, and the size of each block is 128MB as
well. Finally, the system will generate a file table to record
the block addresses and the relation between file segments
and blocks. The others, like Google file system (GFS) [8],
have the similar procedure. For example, the MapReduce
programs, which is a popular tool in big data analysis,
run on block-based distributed file systems, such as GFS
[31] and HDFS, etc. In the MapReduce programs, the input
data is stored in a file partitioned by blocks, and each of
the block is processed by a map task. To reduce the cost
of data transmission, the map task is invoked on the data
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servers where the blocks are stored. These characteristics
lead to the different management in BCSSs from tradition
and higher complexity as well. As a result, the reliability
of BCSSs has been constantly questioned. For instance, the
Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3) accidentally removed
a set of servers due to system software errors, resulting in
tremendous data loss with many customers involved, which
caused great harm to the data integrity in the cloud storage
system [32]. Therefore the problem of reliability of BCSSs is
coming up.
Generally, the reliability of BCSSs is reflected in the
correctness and security aspects. The correctness refers to
the algorithm which can produce the expected output for
each input [7]. The security demands a series of mech-
anisms to protect data from theft or damage. Obviously,
the correctness is the most basic requirement of reliability.
The correctness analysis not only proves the correctness of
the data processing, but also helps to find potential system
design errors. Therefore, we aim to verify the correctness of
BCSSs. In BCSSs, the correctness refers to the management
programs correctness. The BCSSs management programs
mean a series of commands which are used to deal with the
request of user or to manage storage system, such as create,
append, and delete commands. There are plenty of ways to
verify the correctness of programs, such as software testing
techniques and formal verification. The former is popular
due to its low cost, but the disadvantage of incomplete.
Although the latter is a little more expensive, it can provide
strict mathematical analysis support and is efficient in find-
ing errors. Therefore, it is widely used in the safety-critical
systems.
Memory management is challenging for formal verifi-
cation, and memory errors are not easily handled during
program execution. Separation Logic (SL) [22], which is a
Hoare-style logic, is a well-established approach for formal
verification of pointer programs. SL is best at reasoning
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2about computer memory, especially random access memory
[21]. Through introducing a connective ∗ called separating
conjunction, SL is able to reason about the shared mutable
data structures (e.g., various types of linked lists, binary
search trees, and AVL trees). Besides, it has complete asser-
tions and specification rules support for logical reasoning.
In view of data processing operations of files and blocks
in BCSSs management programs are similar to the ordinary
computer memory, SL may just meet the requirements. It
seem that SL is a reasonable way to reason about BCSSs, but
there are some following challenges that are specific to the
complicated target system. (1). How to model the features of
the block-based storage structure? For example, a file consist
of a sequence of blocks located by block address. The low-
level heap-manipulating framework in SL cannot describe
the complicated structure. (2). How to construct the asser-
tions and specifications according to the block-based storage
framework? While the key operations of SL, i.e. separating
conjunction ∗, permit the concise and flexible description
of shared mutable data structures gracefully, they are not
effective in describing the execute actions on the content of
blocks. (3). How to refine the specification rules to make
them concise and effective? When considering a algorithm
with while-loop, the cumbersome specification is difficult in
finding loop invariants. In order to accommodate to these
requirements and restrictions, a novel framework with two-
tier heap structure is constructed, several new operators is
introduced to describe the properties of BCSSs, and a proof
system with Hoare-style specification rules is presented to
reason about the block-manipulating programs.
Formal verification is mature enough for developing the
correctness of most computer programs. For example, P.
Gardner and G. Nizik [18] proposed their work about local
reasoning for the POSIX file system. W.H Hesselink and
M.I Lali [33] provided abstract definitions for file systems
which are defined as a partial function from paths to data.
In addition, some efforts to formalize CSSs have been made.
Stephen et al. [11] used formal methods to analyze data flow
and proposed an execution model for executing Pig Latin
scripts in cloud systems without sacrificing confidentiality
of data. I. Pereverzeva et al. [20] founded a formal solution
for CSS development, which had the capability of modeling
large and elastic data storage system. However, all the above
works cannot model or reason about the existed BCSSs.
Before the formal verification work, firstly a formal
model of the target system is created, which requires a for-
mal modeling language. However, due to the above special
features of BCSSs, it is difficult for existing formal methods
to describe the execution process of BCSSs management
programs accurately from a view of data details. In our
previous work [13], [26], we presented a formal language
to describe management programs of Massive Data Storage
System (henceforth, LMDSS). It is an extension of WHILEh
[28] programming language with new ingredients to de-
scribe file and block operations. Not only can describe mem-
ory management operations, it also describes block-based
storage mutation operations. However, there are three flaws
in LMDSS which make it difficult to describe the BCSSs
programming model: First, LMDSS regards the content of
a block as a big integer. Although it is sufficient to describe
macroscopic file and block operations, for BCSSs manage-
ment programs the data granularity of LMDSS is not fine
enough to accurately describe the process of reading and
appending data record in blocks. Second, the block variables
and general variables are disconnected, which means we
cannot get a value that can be used for general arithmetic
operations from the block content data by some commands.
Third, the assertions and specifications in LMDSS are based
on SL, which has a strong theoretical and practical signif-
icance in verifying low-level storage model. But for BCSSs
model, these are not enough. So if we can enhance LMDSS
by redefining the block content values, connecting block and
general variables, and constructing a proof system, it should
be capable to model the BCSSs management programs.
SL [22] is a mainstream formalization to verify the cor-
rectness of traditional storage systems, which has a strong
theoretical and practical significance. By using SL, N.T
Smith et al. [3] verified the correctness of Cheney’s copy-
ing garbage collector programs in memory management
system. R. Jung et al. [14] extended SL and created the
Iris Logic, which supports the verification of concurrent
programs. J. Berdine et al. [2] proposed the semantics of
symbolic heaps, which is a variant of SL. In recent years,
most of the assertion languages based on SL have adopted
the symbolic heaps model. Recently, several studies [4], [5],
[16], [25] focused on the logical properties of SL. For exam-
ple, Q.T Ta et al. [25] presented a sequent-based deductive
system for automatically proving entailments by the sym-
bolic heap fragment with arbitrary user-defined inductive
heap predicates. In addition, some verification systems have
been implemented in SL [6], [15], [17], [24], [29].
The prior approach of SL to construct verification sys-
tems relies on the principle called “local reasoning”, which
was proposed by O’Hearn [19] as a solution for potential
pointer aliasing problem in program verification. The key
idea of local reasoning is that even though each phrase
of a program can access all stores variables and heaps in
principle, it usually only uses a few of them. Therefore, a
specification and proof can concentrate on only portions of
the heaps that a program accesses. More specifically, two
points are worth emphasizing. Point 1 is that every valid
specification {p}C{q} is “tight” in the sense that every cell,
which is actually used by C , must be either guaranteed to
exist by p or allocated by C . Point 2 is a proof method called
Frame Rule to formalize local reasoning. Such rule which is
an inference rule, allows one to derive a specification from a
given one without ever referring to the actual implementa-
tion of a program. However, SL cannot reason about BCSSs
since it is based on a low-level storage model. Our novel
model works directly on the characteristics of BCSSs, which
can address all the aforementioned problems.
In this paper, we propose a verification framework to
verify the correctness of BCSSs management programs. The
main contributions are as follows.
1) A novel framework with two-tier heap structure is
constructed to reflect the characteristics of BCSSs,
and a modeling language is defined based on the
framework. Especially, we introduce the file and block
expressions to describe the file-block relationship and
refined block content.
2) Assertions based on SL are constructed to describe
the properties of BCSSs. Several new operators are
3introduced to describe the block-heap manipulating
operations, e.g., b1 # b2 asserts that the content of
b1 is corresponding to b2, which enables the block
content to be obtained directly and leaves the address
sequence of the block as an implied condition. Mean-
while, we introduce quantifiers over block and file
variables, which makes the assertions more expres-
sive.
3) A proof system with the Hoare-style specification
rules is proposed to reason about the BCSSs. The
specification rules, which support local reasoning, are
able to describe the behavior of block-manipulating
commands concisely, and some special situations are
addressed that suffice for formal proofs. An example
of verifying a practical algorithm with while-loop is
given to demonstrate the feasibility of our method.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains
background. Section 3 presents a modeling language for
BCSSs, and an assertion language based on SL is constructed
to describe the properties of BCSSs in Section 4. Section
5 proposes the Hoare-style proof system to reason about
the BCSSs. Section 6 prove that the Frame Rule for BCSSs
to reflect local reasoning is soundness. Section 7 gives an
illustrating example, and Section 8 draws conclusions.
2 BACKGROUND
In HDFS, the DataNode stores the data blocks into local
filesystem directories. However, when writing new blocks
to it, there is no guarantee that HDFS will automatically
distribute data evenly among the DataNodes in a cluster, so
it can easily become imbalanced. That may lead to the fre-
quent use of network bandwidth and low storage efficiency
[1].
For redistributing data blocks when an imbalance occurs,
HDFS provides a command line tool called Disk Balancer.
It is mainly implemented by an algorithm called Transfer,
which can let administrators rebalance data across multiple
disks by moving blocks from one disk to another [24].
Apparently, moving blocks is the key operation of Disk
Balancer, which should not lead to any memory errors such
as block losing or content changed. Hence, formal reasoning
is of fundamental importance for this operation.
SL is often used in reasoning about heap-manipulating
programs. However, SL cannot reason about BCSSs since
it is difficult to describe the execution process of the man-
agement programs accurately from a view of block oper-
ation details. Taking the Disk Balancer as an example, it
involves lots of execute actions on the content of blocks,
which is hard for SL to construct the specifications. Besides,
SL cannot check whether the file is consistent before or
after the execution. Therefore, it is necessary to construct
a verification framework of BCSSs to prove the correctness
problems caused by the complexity of the block-based stor-
age structure according to the characteristics of BCSSs.
The main concepts of the proposed framework is illus-
trated in the rest of the section. An initial, high level, and in-
complete abstract model of the framework is shown in Fig.1.
To describe the BCSSs management programs, the SL heap
is extended by introducing a two-tier heap structure, which
is consist of HeapsB and HeapsV , while the ordinary store
is also extended to reflect the file-block relationship, such as
StoresF . The whole computational states of the framework
is described later in Sect.3. In our model, the files are stored
as follows. A file variable f is mapped to a sequence of
block addresses bloc1, ..., block by StoresF . HeapsB maps
each of these block addresses to a sequence of location
addresses. HeapsV maps each of these location addresses
to a value. In particular, not every location address must
belong to a certain block, the rest addresses in HeapsV are
likewise mapped to values. Notice that this novel model is
not simply a double combination of SL since there is a joint
implication between the two tiers of the heap structure, i.e.,
some location address in HeapsV belongs to a certain block,
which SL cannot express.
Fig. 1. Abstract Model of the Verification Framework
3 MODELING LANGUAGE FOR BCSSS
In this section, the definition of the block content is adjusted
based on LMDSS in the introduction in order to have a
better description of data processing in BCSSs management
programs. Furthermore, we connect new block variables
with general variables to reflect the characteristics of the
block-based storage structure.
3.1 Syntax
In our language there are four kinds of expressions: (arith-
metic) location expressions, file expressions, block expres-
sions, and Boolean expressions. The full syntax for expres-
sions and commands in the language is as follows.
e ::= n | x, y, ... | e1 + e2 | e1 − e2 | e1 × e2 | #f | #bk
fe ::= nil | f | fe · bk | fe1 · fe2
bk ::= n | b | f.e
be ::= e1 = e2 | e1 ≤ e2 | bk1 == bk2 | true | false | ¬be |
be1 ∧ be2 | be1 ∨ be2
C ::= x := e | x := cons(e¯) | x := [e] | [e] := e′ |
dispose(e) | f := create(bk∗) | attach(f, bk∗) |
delete f | b := allocate(e¯) | append(bk, e) |
x := {bk.e} | b := bk | delete bk | f.e := bk |
C;C ′ | if be then C else C ′ | while be do C ′
where e is written for location expressions, fe for file
expressions, bk for block expressions, be for Boolean expres-
sions, and C for commands.
4Intuitively, #f means the block numbers the file f
occupies, and f.e points out the address that the i-th block
of the file f corresponds to, where i is the value of the lo-
cation expression e. For brevity, we abbreviate the sequence
e1, ..., en of the location expressions by e¯, and the sequence
bk1, ..., bk2 of the block expressions by bk∗.
Besides the commands in WHILEh, which contains all
commands of IMP [27], we introduce some new commands
to describe the special operations about files and blocks in
the BCSSs management programs.
File commands contain four core operations, which seem
to be enough to describe the majority of daily-file operations
in CSSs.
• f := create(bk∗): file creation;
• attach(f, bk∗): block address appending;
• delete f : file deletion.
The file creation command creates a file that consists of
block sequence at block addresses expressed by bk∗. The
block address appending command can append blocks at
block addresses bk∗ to an existing file. The file deletion
command removes a file and all blocks belong to it become
orphaned.
Block commands express block operations. They are as
follows.
• b := allocate(e¯): block allocation;
• append(bk, e): block content append;
• x := {bk.e}: block content lookup;
• b := bk: block address assignment;
• f.e := bk: block address of a file assignment;
• delete bk: block deletion.
The block allocation command creates a block with the
initial value e¯, which is the content data of the block. The
block content append command appends data e after the
content. Since the content of a block is an integer value
sequence at present, the block content lookup command
reads the content of the i-th field of the block bk, where
i is the evaluation of expression e. The block address as-
signment command assigns value bk to block variable b. In
most of the time, this command is used for the situation
involving the file operations, so we add the block address
of a file assignment command as an alternative to make
the modeling language more powerful. The block deletion
command is formulated similarly as file deletion command
with the difference in replacing the file variable by block
variable.
3.2 Domains
The model has five components: StoresV , StoresB , StoresF ,
HeapsV , and HeapsB . StoresV is a total function mapping
from location variables to addresses. StoresB denotes a total
function mapping from block variables to block addresses.
Strictly speaking, values, addresses, and block addresses are
different in type. But in our language, to permit unrestricted
address arithmetic, we assume that all the values, addresses,
and block addresses are integers. StoresF represents a total
function mapping from file variables into a sequence of
block addresses. HeapsV is indexed by a subset Loc of the
integers, and it is accessed using indirect addressing [e],
where e is a location expression. HeapsB is indexed by a
subset BLoc of the integers, and it is accessed using indirect
addressing {bk}, where bk is a block expression.
Values , {...− 1, 0, 1, ...} = Z Loc,BLoc,Atoms ⊆ Values
Var , {x, y, ...} BKVar , {b1, b2, ...} FVar , {f1, f2, ...}
StoresV , Var→ Values StoresB , BKVar→ BLoc
StoresF , FVar→ BLoc∗
HeapsB , BLoc ⇀fin Loc
∗ HeapsV , Loc ⇀fin Values
where ⇀ and ⇀fin can be found in [30]. Loc, BLoc
and Atoms are disjoint, and BLoc∗ = {(bloc1, ..., blocn) |
bloci ∈ BLoc, n ∈ N}, and for any element (bloc1, ...,
blocn) of BLoc∗, |(bloc1, ..., blocn)| means its length, that is,
|(bloc1, ..., blocn)| = n. Similarly, Loc∗ = {(loc1, ..., locn) |
loci ∈ Loc, n ∈ N}.
To make sure the successful allocation, we place the
following requirements on the sets of Loc and BLoc. For
any positive integer m, there are infinitely many sequences
of length m of consecutive integers in Loc. For any positive
integer n, there are infinitely many sequences of length m
of discrete integers in BLoc. These requirement are satisfied
if we take Loc and BLoc as the non-negative integers. Then
we can take Atoms as the negative integers, and nil as -1.
The states of our language are defined as follows:
States , StoresF × StoresB × StoresV ×HeapsB ×HeapsV
A state σ ∈ States is a 5-tuple: (sF , sB , sV , hB , hV ).
3.3 Semantics of the modeling language
Once the states are defined, we can specify the evaluation
rules of our new expressions. Notice that when we try to
give out the semantic of an expression, some stores and
heaps may not be used. For example, expression #f only
needs StoresF and StoresV . So we will only list the necessary
stores and heaps for each expression. The semantics of the
expressions which is similar to LMDSS can be found in [13].
Here we give out the semantics of new expressions. One
is the block content length expression #bk, which is used
to calculate the content size of the block at address bk. Note
that in the extended language the content of a block will be a
sequence of integers. This expression will count the length of
this sequence. So we can find out how much data(integers)
has been written in the current block, and then calculate
how much data can be write to this clock, for the maximum
size of a block in the system is fixed. The denotational
semantics of expression #bk is in the following.J#bkK(sF )(sB)(sV )(hB) = k,
where hB(JbkK(sF )(sB)(sV )(hB)) = (loc1, loc2, ..., lock),
The others are file expressions, the denotational seman-
tics of file expressions is ruled out by the following func-
tions:JnilK(sF ) = ();JfK(sF ) = sF (f);Jfe · bkK(sF )(sB) = (bloc1, . . . , blocn, bloc′),
if JfeK(sF )(sB) = (bloc1, . . . , blocn) and JbkK(sB) = bloc′;Jfe1 · fe2K(sF )(sB) = (bloc1, . . . , blocn, bloc1′, . . . , blocn′),
if Jfe1K(sF )(sB) = (bloc1, . . . , blocn) andJfe2K(sF )(sB) = (bloc1′, . . . , blocn′).
To state the semantics of the modeling language for-
mally, following [28], we use the crucial operations on the
heaps:
5• dom(hH) denotes the domain of a heap hH ∈ HeapsH ,
where hH range over hV and hB , HeapsH range over
HeapsV and HeapsB , and dom(sS) is the domain of a
store sS ∈ StoresS , where sS range over sV , sB and sF ,
StoresS range over StoresV , StoresB and StoresF ;
• hH#hH ′ indicates that the domains of hH and hH ′ are
disjoint;
• hH ∗hH ′ is defined when hH#hH ′ holds and is a finite
function obtained by taking the union of hH and hH
′;
• i 7→ j is a singleton partial function which maps i to j;
• for a partial function f from U to W and f ′ from V to
W , the partial function f [f ′] from U to W is defined
by:
f [f ′](i) ,

f ′(i) if i ∈ dom(f ′),
f(i) if i ∈ dom(f),
undefined otherwise.
Here we give out the denotational semantics of our new
commands.
Jf := create(bk∗)Kσ = (sF [(Jbk1Kσ, ..., JbknKσ)/f ], sB , sV , hB , hV )
where the term of sequence determined by hB(JbkiKσ) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) belong
todom(hV );Jattach(f, bk∗)Kσ = (sF [(sF (f)  (Jbk1Kσ, ..., JbknKσ))/f ], sB , sV , hB
, hV )where the term of sequence determined by hB(JbkiKσ) (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
belong to dom(hV );Jdelete fK(sF , sB , sV , hB , hV ) = (sF [JnilKσ/f ], sB , sV , hB , hV );Jb := allocate(e¯)Kσ = (sF , sB [bloc/b], sV , hB [(loc1, ..., locn)/bloc],
[hV |loc1 : Je1Kσ, ..., locn : JenKσ])
where bloc ∈ BLoc− dom(hB) , and loc1, ..., locn ∈ Loc− dom(hV );Jappend(bk, e)Kσ = (sF , sB , sV , hB [(loc1, ..., locm, locm+1)/JbkKσ],
[hV |locm+1 : JeKσ]) where hB(JbkKσ) = (loc1, ..., locm), the term of
sequence (loc1, ..., locm) belong to dom(hV ), and locm+1 ∈ Loc−
dom(hV );Jx := {bk.e}Kσ = (sF , sB , sV [hV (loci)/x], hB , hV )
where hB(JbkKσ) = (loc1, ..., locm),JeKσ = i and 1 ≤ i ≤ m;Jb := bkKσ = (sF , sB [JbkKσ/b], sV , hB , hV );Jf.e := bkKσ = (sF [(bloc1, ..., JbkKσ, ..., blocn)/f ], sB , sV , hB , hV )
where sF (f) = (bloc1, ..., bloci, ..., blocn),JeKσ = i and 1 ≤ i ≤ n;Jdelete bKσ = (sF , sB , sV , hBe(dom(hB)− {JbKσ}), hV ).
3.4 A Semantic Example
At this stage we will give a slightly nontrivial example of a
formal proof with our modeling language. In the example,
according to the denotational semantics, we derive a final
state from the initial state by steps. The final state describes
the configuration of the system after running the program,
which achieved the expected results. This results show the
modeling language is expressive enough to describe the
management programs in BCSSs, and the semantics is strict
and feasible. The modeling language and its semantic pro-
vide the basis for the nature of BCSSs research. Hence, we
can define our assertion language and prove the correctness
of management programs. The description of the example
and all proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
4 ASSERTION LANGUAGE FOR BCSSS
To describe the properties of BCSSs, we construct a logic to
deal with both locations and blocks. BI Pointer Logic [10]
provides a powerful formalism for ordinary locations. We
extend BI pointer logic with the file and block expressions
to describe the file-block relationship. Following [28], the
formal semantics of an assertion is defined by a satisfactory
relation “ |= ” between a state and an assertion. σ |= pmeans
that the assertion p holds in the state σ.
We rename the assertions of BI pointer logic as loca-
tion assertions, meanwhile call the block formulas as block
assertions. Both location assertions and block assertions are
built on expressions. The key challenge is that the assertion
language should be able to express the two-tier structure of
the framework.
4.1 Location Assertion
Syntax. Location assertions describe the properties of loca-
tions. However, there are some differences between the BI
assertions and the location assertions. Quantifiers over block
and file variables are allowed in location assertions. This
makes the location assertions much more complicated since
they are not first-order quantifiers.
α ::= trueV | falseV | ¬α | α1 ∧ α2 | α1 ∨ α2 | α1 → α2
| e1 = e2 | e1 ≤ e2 | ∀x.α | ∃x.α | | ∀f.α | ∃f.α |
∀b.α | ∃b.α | empV | e 7→ e′ | α1 ∗ α2 | α1 −∗ α2
Semantics. Intuitively, the truth value of a location assertion
depends only on the stores and heaps for location variables.
Given a location assertion α, we define σ |= α by induction
on α in the following.
• σ |= trueV ;
• σ |= α1 → α2 iff if σ |= α1 then σ |= α2;
• σ |= (∀x.α) iff sF , sB , sV [n/x], hB , hV |= α for any n ∈
Loc;
• σ |= (∀f.α) iff sF [n¯/f ], sB , sV , hB , hV |= α
for any n¯ = (n1, n2, . . . , nk) ∈ BlockLoc*;
• σ |= (∃f.α) iff sF [n¯/f ], sB , sV , hB , hV |= α
for some n¯ = (n1, n2, . . . , nk) ∈ BlockLoc*;
• σ |= empV iff dom(hV ) = ∅;
• σ |= e 7→ e′ iff dom(hV ) = {JeKσ} ∧ hV (JeKσ) = Je′Kσ;
• σ |= α1 ∗ α2 iff there exist h1V , h2V with
h1V #h
2
V and hV = h
1
V ∗h2V such that
sF , sB , sV , hB , h
1
V |= α1 and sF , sB , sV , hB , h2V |= α2.
Definition of other location assertions are similar to these
in BI pointer logic.
4.2 Block Assertion
Syntax. Block assertions describe the properties about
blocks. So they include the logic operations and heap
operations on block expressions besides ordinary logical
connectives and quantifies.
β ::= trueB | falseB | ¬β | β1 ∧ β2 | β1 ∨ β2 | β1 → β2
| bk1 == bk2 | bk == bk1 ~ · · ·~ bkn | ∀x.β |
∃x.β | ∀b.β | ∃b.β | ∀f.β | ∃f.β | empB |
bk 7→ (e¯) | β1 ∗ β2 | β1 −∗ β2 | fe = fe′ | b1 # b2
6Semantics. Obviously, the truth value of a block assertion
depends on the stores and heaps for blocks. Given a block
assertion β, we define σ |= β by induction on β as follows.
• σ |= trueB ;
• σ |= bk1 == bk2 iff Jbk1Kσ = Jbk2Kσ;
• σ |= bk == bk1 ~ · · · ~ bkn iff JbkKσ = Jbk1Kσ · · · · ·JbknKσ and JbkiKσ⊥JbkjKσ
for all i, j ∈ N, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n
• σ |= (∀x.β) iff sF , sB , sV [n/x], hB , hV |= β
for any n ∈ Loc;
• σ |= (∃b.β) iff sF , sB [n/b], sV , hB , hV |= β
for some n ∈ BLoc;
• σ |= (∀f.β) iff sF [n¯/f ], sB , sV , hB , hV |= β
for any n¯ = (n1, n2, . . . , nk) ∈ BLoc*;
• σ |= bk 7→ (e¯) iff dom(hB) = {JbkKσ},
hB(JbkKσ) = (Je1Kσ, ..., JenKσ), andJeiKσ ∈ dom(hV ) (1 ≤ i ≤ n);
• σ |= (β1 −∗ β2) iff for any block heap hB ′,
if hB
′#hB and sF , sB , sV , hB ′, hV |= β1,
then sF , sB , sV , hB∗hB ′, hV |= β2;
• σ |= fe = fe′ iff JfeKσ = Jfe′Kσ;
• σ |= b1 # b2 iff sB(b1) ∈ dom(hB) when b1 = b2 or
hV (hB(sB(b1))) = hV (hB(sB(b2))) when b1 6= b2.
where the notation · means the concatenation of se-
quences, and ⊥ denotes two sequences have no common
subsequence.
It is noticed that quantifiers over block and file vari-
ables are necessary for the assertions. In the specification
language, we need to express the existence of a sequence
of addresses due to the inherent complexity of BCSSs. If
the length of the sequence is dynamic, for example in a
while loop, we cannot use the existence of location variables
because the number of the variables is indeterminate. We
address this case by introducing the quantifier over block
variable that implicitly shows the dynamic length of the
address sequence.
In addition, we define some new block assertions to
describe the address sequence and the content of a block,
for example, bk 7→ (e¯) and b1 # b2. In these assertions,
we straightly show the content of blocks and leaves the
address sequence as an implied condition. In the specifica-
tion language, some commands only change the content of
a block, so we do not need to describe the address sequence
in pre- and post-conditions, this improvement permits the
concise description of the inference rules. Furthermore, with
the quantifiers over block variables, the assertion language
could express the change of block content flexibly.
4.3 Global Assertion
Syntax. Roughly speaking, (location assertion,block assertion)
pairs are called global assertions, and the two components of
a pair effect each other. We use the symbol p to stand for the
global assertions, with the following BNF equation:
p ::= 〈α, β〉 | true | false | ¬p | p1 ∧ p2 | p1 ∨ p2 | p1 → p2
| ∀x.p | ∃x.p | ∀b.p | ∃b.p | ∀f.p | ∃f.p |
emp | p1 ∗ p2 | p1 −∗ p2
Semantics. The truth value of a global assertion depends on
all kinds of stores and heaps. Given a global assertion p,
we define sV , sB , sF , hV , hB |= p by induction on p in the
following.
• true , 〈trueV , trueB〉; emp , 〈empV , empB〉;
• σ |= 〈α, β〉 iff σ |= α and σ |= β;
• σ |= ¬p iff σ 6|= p;
• σ |= p1 ∨ p2 iff σ |= p1 or σ |= p2;
• σ |= p1 → p2 iff if σ |= p1 then σ |= p2;
• σ |= ∀x.p iff sV [n/x], sB , sF , hV , hB |= p for any
n ∈ Loc;
• σ |= ∀b.p iff sV , sB [n/b], sF , hV , hB |= p for any n ∈
BLoc;
• σ |= ∀f.p iff sV , sB , sF [n¯/f ], hV , hB |= p
for any n¯=(n1, n2,. . ., nk)∈BLoc*;
• σ |= emp iff dom(hV ) = ∅ and dom(hB) = ∅;
• sV , sB , sF , hV , hB |= p1∗p2 iff there exists h1H , h2H with
h1H#h
2
H and hH = h
1
H ∗ h2H such that
sV , sB , sF , h
1
V , h
1
B |= p1 and sV , sB , sF , h2V , h2B |= p2
where hiH range over h
i
V and h
i
B and i = 1, 2;
• σ |= (p1 −∗ p2) iff for any block heap hH ′,
if hH
′#hH and sV , sB , sF , hV ′, hB ′ |= p1,
then sV , sB , sF , hV ∗ hV ′, hB ∗ hB ′ |= p2,
where hH range over hV and hB .
Notice that, in the semantic of 〈α, β〉, we do not just
simply use α ∧ β here, because such form will mislead
the reader that block assertions can be used all alone. In
practical, the content of blocks are stored in HeapsV for the
architecture of BCSSs. In our setting, location assertions and
block assertions work together to describe the blocks cor-
rectly, and the pair form can elegantly express the relation
between the two tiers as well as the properties of BCSSs.
It is convenient to introduce several complex forms as
abbreviations below, which are from [22], where some simi-
lar terminologies can be found. For brevity, we use location
variable l to denote the address, and location variable x
denotes the content, which will be more readable.
• e 7→ e1, ..., en , e1 7→ e1 ∗ ... ∗ e+ n− 1 7→ en
• bk 7→ l¯ , bk 7→ (l1, ..., ln) where #bk = |l¯| = n;
• l¯ # (e¯|i x) , l1 7→ e1 ∗ ... ∗ li 7→ x ∗ ... ∗ ln 7→ en;
• l¯ # (e¯[x′/x]|i  x′′) , l1 7→ e1[x′/x] ∗ ... ∗ li 7→
x′′ ∗ ... ∗ ln 7→ en[x′/x];
• bk # e¯ , ∃x¯.〈x¯ # e¯, bk 7→ x¯〉 where |x¯| = |e¯| and the
term of sequence x¯ are disjoint;
• e ↪→ e′ , e 7→ e′ ∗ trueV ;
• bk ↪→ (e¯) , bk 7→ (e¯) ∗ trueB .
The advantages of global assertions are threefold:
1) The pair form of global assertions is consistent with the
hierarchical structural of the framework. Location and
block assertions can describe the state of HeapsV and
HeapsB , respectively. Meanwhile, the pair can exactly
express the content of each block.
2) We mainly focus on the properties of blocks in BCSSs.
With the new defined notations ==, 7→, and#, we are
able to describe the address sequence and the content
of a block.
3) We introduce quantifiers over block and file variables,
which makes the assertion language more expressive.
Combined with the new defined assertions, we are able
to write the pre- and post-conditions in Hoare triples,
especially the while loop invariants.
7With the advantages, our logic is quite different from SL,
and more complicated. The assertion language can support
the specification language well. More discussions about
assertion language will be discussed in the future.
5 HOARE-STYLE PROOF SYSTEM FOR BCSSS
For reasoning about management programs in BCSSs, com-
bining with the modeling language and the assertion lan-
guage above, we introduce a Hoare-style proof system. The
main concept in Hoare-style logic are Hoare triples, which
consists of a precondition, a program, and a postcondition.
In our setting, we restrict the pre- and post-conditions to be
global assertions only. Formally, a Hoare triple is of the form
{p} C {q}, where p and q are global assertion, and C is a
command.
5.1 Local Reasoning
To define the semantics of Hoare triples , two point of local
reasoning from the Introduction are recalled as follows.
Point 1: Every valid specification {p}C{q} is “tight”,
that is to say when C runs in a state satisfying p, it must
dereference only those cells that guaranteed to exist by p or
allocated during the execution by possible commands like
x := cons(e1, ..., en) or f := create(bk∗).
Point 2: An inference rule about specification, known as
the Frame Rule, enables us obtain {p ∗ r}C{q ∗ r} from the
initial specification {p}C{q} of a command when premise
of the Frame Rule is valid. Thus, we can concentrate on the
variables and parts of heaps that are actually accessed by
the program which is ensured correct by Point 1, and we
can extend a local specification by using the Frame Rule. We
will proof soundness of the Frame Rule in Sect.6.
5.2 Interpretation of Hoare Triples
Interpretation of Hoare Triples. According to Point 1, a tight
interpretation of specifications does not dereference the non-
addresses, otherwise it will lead to an error memory fault or
fault for short.
We use the terminologies below to specify
the certain properties of the program execu-
tion. “〈C, (sV , sB , sF , hV , hB)〉 is safe ” when
〈C, (sV , sB , sF , hV , hB)〉  ∗ fault is impossible;
“〈C, (sV , sB , sF , hV , hB)〉 must terminate normally” when
〈C, (sV , sB , sF , hV , hB)〉 is safe and there exists no infinite
 − sequences starting from 〈C, (sV , sB , sF , hV , hB)〉.
Each Hoare triple can be interpreted for partial correctness
and for total correctness as follows.
Partial Correctness:{p}C{q} is true iff for ∀(sV , sB , sF , hV , hB).
if (sV , sB , sF , hV , hB) |= p then
1.〈C, (sV , sB , sF , hV , hB)〉 is safe
2. if 〈C, (sV , sB , sF , hV , hB)〉 ∗
(sV
′, sB ′, sF ′, hV ′, hB ′)
then (sV ′, sB ′, sF ′, hV ′, hB ′) |= q
Total Correctness:{p}C{q} is true iff for ∀(sV , sB , sF , hV , hB).
if (sV , sB , sF , hV , hB) |= p then
1.〈C, (sV , sB , sF , hV , hB)〉 must terminate
2. if 〈C, (sV , sB , sF , hV , hB)〉 ∗
(sV
′, sB ′, sF ′, hV ′, hB ′)
then (sV ′, sB ′, sF ′, hV ′, hB ′) |= q
Transfer Function. According to syntax, any Boolean ex-
pression cannot be any kind of assertion. Hence, it cannot
appear in any specification. Thus Boolean expressions in if
or while commands cannot be used directly in pre- or post-
conditions. To fix this problem, we define the transfer func-
tion T that maps Boolean expressions to global assertions.
T ∈ Transfer functions = Boolean expressions ⇀ Global
assertions
T (e1 = e2) = 〈e1 = e2, trueB〉
T (e1 ≤ e2) = 〈e1 ≤ e2, trueB〉
T (bk1 == bk2) = 〈trueV , bk1 == bk2〉
T (be1 ∧ be2) = T (be1) ∧ T (be2)
T (be1 ∨ be2) = T (be1) ∨ T (be2)
T (true) = true T (false) = false T (¬be) = ¬T (be)
T (abort) = abort
5.3 The Proof System
In this section, we present the proof system for BCSSs, which
consists of the axioms, the compound command rules, and
the structural rules. We propose one or more axioms for each
basic command. Similar to BI pointer logic, the compound
command rules and the structural rules does not depend on
particular programming constructs.
Axioms. Firstly, we give the original axioms of SL. The
pre- and post-conditions are both given in the form of
〈location assertion, block assertion〉 since they are global as-
sertions. It is observed that these cases do not involve files
or block operations, so all of the rules given here remain
valid for our logic.
• Skip
{p} skip {p} (A1)
• The Simple Assignment form (SA)
{〈x = x′ ∧ empV , empB〉} x := e
{〈x = e[x′/x] ∧ empV , empB〉}
(A2)
where x′ is distinct from x.
• The Location Allocation form (LA)
{〈x = x′ ∧ empV , empB〉} x := cons(e1, ..., en)
{〈x 7→ e1[x′/x], ..., en[x′/x], empB〉}
(A3)
where x′ is distinct from x.
• The Location Lookup form (LL)
{〈x = x′ ∧ e 7→ x′′, empB〉} x := [e]
{〈x = x′′ ∧ e[x′/x] 7→ x′′, empB〉}
(A4)
where x, x′, and x′′ are distinct.
• The Location Mutation form (LM)
{〈e 7→ −, empB〉} [e] := e′ {〈e 7→ e′, empB〉} (A5)
• The Deallocation form (DL)
{〈e 7→ −, empB〉} dispose(e) {〈empV , empB〉} (A6)
Commands of file will change StoresF , which may have
impact on both location assertions and block assertions. To
make axioms simple, we only discuss the situation when the
file changed in commands does not appear in the location
assertion. In A8, one may argue that it cannot be applied
when file expression #f appears in the assertion. To this
end, we construct an alternative axiom for A8, which is
described latter in Sect.5.4. For the moment, we ignore
particular specifications, and give the common axioms that
suffice for formal proofs.
8• The File Creation form (FC)
{〈α, f = nil ∧ β〉} f := create(bk1, ..., bkn) {〈α, β[(bk1, ..., bkn)/f ]〉}
(A7)
where f is not free in α or bk1, ..., bkn.
• The Block Address Appending form (BAA)
{〈α, f = f ′ ∧ β〉} attach(f, bk1, ..., bkn)
{〈α[f ′/f ], β[f ′ · (bk1[f ′/f ], ..., bkn[f ′/f ])/f ]}
(A8)
where f ′ is distinct from f .
• The File Deletion form (FD)
{〈α, f = f ′ ∧ β〉} delete f {〈α[f ′/f ], β[nil/f ]〉} (A9)
where f ′ is distinct from f .
Finally, we come to the block commands for manipulat-
ing the HeapsB , which gives rise to a surprising variety of
axioms. For some commands, two axioms are given to make
the specification language more expressive. To explain these
axioms, we begin with A10. Here, for a precondition with
empty HeapsV and HeapsB (to show locality), the post-
condition says that a new block is created with a sequence
of location addresses, and the content of these addresses
is e¯. The restrictions on this axiom are needed to avoid
aliasing. But this axiom cannot be applied generally since
the postcondition of a specific form restricts our reasoning.
Especially, the quantifiers over a sequence of location ad-
dresses cannot appear in while loop invariants. Therefore,
an alternative axiom A11 is given to avoid these complex
quantification using block variables. The rest axioms will be
proceed similarly if necessary. Notice that in A12 and A13,
we can not substitute empV for α since bk is well-defined.
When we turn to the axiom for block content lookup, the
situation becomes more complicated since such command
involves refined block content, i.e., query the content of a
certain location address belonging to a block. The difficulty
with this axiom is the accumulation of quantifiers. In A15,
one can think of b′ as the first part of block bk, and b′′
denotes the latter part. While, b denotes a singleton block
heap, the content of which is a single address l with content
x′′.
In most time, we use block address assignment com-
mand to assign the content of a file block to a new block,
so an axiom A17 is added in the special case of A16 to make
the specifications more powerful. The remaining axioms are
relatively well-understood, and not explained in detail.
• The Block Allocation form (BA)
{〈empV , empB〉} b := allocate(e¯) {∃l¯.〈l¯# e¯, b 7→ l¯〉} (A10)
where b is not free in e¯.
• Alternative Axiom for Block Allocation (BAalt)
{〈empV , empB〉} b := allocate(e¯) {∃b′.〈trueV , b == b′ ∧ b′ # b′〉}
(A11)
where b is not free in e¯.
• The Block Content Append form (BCA)
{∃l¯′.〈l¯′ # e¯′, bk 7→ l¯′〉} append(bk, e) {∃l¯′, l.〈l¯′ # e¯′∗l 7→ e, bk 7→ l¯′·(l)〉}
(A12)
where bk is not free in e¯′, e¯ and #bk does not appear in bk.
• Alternative Axiom for Block Content Append (BCAalt)
{∃b′.〈trueV , bk == b′ ∧ b′ # b′〉} append(bk, e)
{∃b′, b′′, l.〈trueV ∗ l 7→ e, bk == b′ ~ b′′ ∧ trueB ∗ b′ # b′ ∗ b′′ 7→ (l)〉}
(A13)
where bk is not free in e¯′, e¯ and #bk does not appear in bk.
• The Block Content Lookup form (BCL)
{∃l¯.〈x = x′ ∧ e = i ∧ l¯# (e¯|i x′′), bk 7→ l¯〉} x := {bk.e}
{∃l¯.〈x = x′′ ∧ e[x′/x] = i ∧ l¯# (e¯[x′/x]|i x′′), bk[x′/x] 7→ l¯〉}(A14)
where x, x′, and x′′ are distinct.
• Alternative Axiom for Block Content Lookup (BCLalt)
{∃b, b′, b′′, l.〈#b = i− 1 ∧ x = x′ ∧ e = i ∧ l ↪→ x′′, bk == b~ b′ ~ b′′
∧ b′ ↪→ (l)〉} x := {bk.e} {∃b, b′, b′′, l.〈#b = i− 1 ∧ x = x′′ ∧ e[x′/x]
= i ∧ l ↪→ x′′, bk == b~ b′ ~ b′′ ∧ b′ ↪→ (l)〉}
(A15)
where x, x′, and x′′ are distinct.
• The Block Address Assignment form (BAA)
{〈α, b == b′ ∧ β〉} b := bk {〈α[b′/b], b == bk[b′/b] ∧ β[b′/b]〉} (A16)
where b′ is distinct from b.
• Alternative Axiom for Block Address Assignment (BAAalt)
{〈#f2 = i− 1 ∧ α, f = f2 · b′ · f3 ∧ β〉} b := f.i
{〈#f2 = i− 1 ∧ α, f = f2 · b′ · f3 ∧ b == b′ ∧ β〉}
(A17)
where b′ is distinct from b, and b is not free in α or β.
• The Block Address Replacement of a File form (BARF)
{〈#f2 = e− 1 ∧ α, f = f2 · bk′ · f3 ∧ β〉} f.e := bk
{〈#f2 = e− 1 ∧ α, f = f2 · bk · f3 ∧ β〉}
(A18)
where f.e does not appear in α or β.
• The Block Deletion form (BD)
{∃l¯.〈l¯# −, b 7→ l¯〉} delete b {∃l¯.〈l¯# −, empB〉} (A19)
where b does not appear in the expressions which are omitted.
For space reasons, the soundness of the axioms given
above is proved in the appendix of [12].
Rules. In contrast to aforementioned axioms, the rules are
applicable to arbitrary commands, which are be called
structural rules. In our new setting, the command-specific
inference rules and the structural rules of SL remain sound.
Rule of composition applies to sequentially executed
programs.
{p} C {q} {q} C ′ {r}
{p} C;C ′ {r} (R1)
Conditional rule states that a postcondition common to
then and else part is also a postcondition of the whole if
statement.
{p ∧ T (be)}C{q} {p ∧ ¬T (be)}C ′{q}
{p} if be then C else C ′ {q} (R2)
If the evaluation of be causes an abort, we can use the
following rule to show the program aborts.
{r1∧T (be) = abort} if be then c1 else c2 {abort} (R2A)
While rule states that the loop invariant is preserved by
the loop body.
{p ∧ T (be)}C ′{p}
{p} while be do C ′ {p ∧ ¬T (be)} (R3)
Similar to R2A, R3A shows the program aborts when
evaluating be.
{r ∧ T (be) = abort} while be do c {abort} (R3A)
We use FV(C) to denote the set of free variables which
occur in C , and Modify(C) represents the set of variables
modified by C , which appear on a left side of an assignment
statement. Let V arV be a set of location variables, V arB
be a set of block variables, V arF be a set of file variables,
and V arS range over V arV , V arB , and V arF ; YS be the
set of variables that all allocated variables in stores are
precisely in and YS range over YV , YB , and YF ; XS be the
set of variables modified by C and XS range over XV ,XB ,
and XF . Then, for commands C with ModifyV (C) = XV ,
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XF , and FV(C) ⊆ Y , we give the following structural rules.
Consequence Rules:
|= p′ → p {p}C{q} |= q → q′
{p′}C{q′} (R4)
Auxiliary Variable Elimination:
{p}C{q}
{∃xS .p}C{∃xS .q} xS /∈ FV(C) (R5)
where xS ∈ V arS and xS range over xV , xB , and xF .
Auxiliary Variable Renaming:
{p}C{q}
{p[yS/xS ]}C{q[yS/xS ]}
xS /∈ FV(C) ∧ yS /∈ (FV(C)∪
FV(p) ∪ FV(q))
(R6)
where xS , yS ∈ V arS , xS range over xV ,xB and xF , and yS
range over yV , yB and yF .
Frame Rule:
{p}C{q}
{p ∗ r}C{q ∗ r} ModifyS(C) ∩ FV(r) = ∅ (R7)
where ModifyS(C) range over ModifyV (C), ModifyB(C),
and ModifyF (C).
5.4 More about Specification
Additional Axioms. For several of the axioms we have
given, there are particular versions. For instance:
• The Block Address Appending form (BAAp)
{〈#f = m ∧ α, f = f ′ ∧ β〉} attach(f, bk∗)
{〈#f = m+ n ∧ α[f ′/f ], β[f ′ · (bk1[f ′/f ], ..., bkn[f ′/f ])/f ]}
(A20)
where f ′ is distinct from f .
• An instance:
{〈#f1 = 3 ∧#f2 = 2, f1 = f2 · b〉} attach(f1, f1.3)
{〈#(f2 · b) = 3 ∧#f2 = 2, , f1 = f2 · b · b} (1)
In practice, such axiom is rarely used. The only time it is
necessary to use is when one must prove a specification with
the location expression #f . It can usually be avoided by
renaming #f in the program before proving it. The similar
situation will occur in the specifications that include #b,
which will be discussed in the future.
Scalability Issues. For each of commands, we can give three
kinds of inference: local, global, and backward-reasoning.
SL has some work in this area [10], and some similar work
for BCSSs is done. For example, the following instance of
block content loop command is the most complex one,
which is shown in equation A21. Obviously, such backwards
version can be applied generally since it works for any
postcondition (p).
• The Block Content Lookup Backward form (BCLBw)
{e = i ∧ ∃l¯, x′.(〈l¯ # (e¯|i x′), bk 7→ l¯〉 ∗ (〈l¯ # (e¯[x′/x]|
i x′), bk[x′/x] 7→ l¯〉 −∗ p[x′/x]))} x := {bk.e} {p}
(A21)
where x′ is not free in e and p.
6 SOUNDNESS OF THE FRAME RULE FOR BCSSS
In this section, we undertake to prove that the Frame Rule
for BCSSs is soundness. The soundness result guarantees
that the approach we formalize local reasoning is valid.
Recall the structural rules, we have the syntactic version of
the Frame Rule:
{p} − {q}
{p ∗ r} − {q ∗ r} ModifyS(C) ∩ FV(r) = ∅
where ModifyS(C) range over ModifyV (C), ModifyB(C),
and ModifyF (C).
Since we treat predicates semantically in this paper,
we need to reformulate the Frame Rule to get a semantic
version and we need to rewrite the condition in the syntactic
version of the Frame Rule. Let ModifyS(C) = XS , then the
condition in the syntactic version of the Frame Rule can be
written as:
XS ∩ FV(r) = ∅
Now we analyze such condition, review the Sect.4,
the interpretation of an assertion r is given by
{(sV , sB , sF , hV , hB) | (sV , sB , sF , hV , hB) ∈ r}.
1) For variables whether location variables, block vari-
ables, or file variables, the condition simply checks
whether any variable in r is modified by the com-
mand C .
2) For heap cells which are composed of the heap for
variables and heap for blocks, the condition is more
elaborate. Consider for the conclusion of the rule,
with the definition of “∗”, which says that for every
state satisfying p ∗ r , the current heap can be split
into two subheaps so that p holds for the one and r
for the other. Then for the premise of the rule, the tight
interpretation of the Hoare triple {p}C{q} says that
the command can only access the cells guaranteed
to exist by p which is involved in Point1. So r is
an invariant during the execution which is what the
condition says.
Similar to the semantic of ∀x.r, we define:
∀XV .r = {(sV , sB , sF , hV , hB) | ∀sV ′ ∈ StoresV (XV ).
(sV [sV
′], sB , sF , hV , hB) ∈ r};
∀XB .r = {(sV , sB , sF , hV , hB) | ∀sB ′ ∈ StoresB(XB).
(sV , sB [sB
′], sF , hV , hB) ∈ r};
∀XF .r = {(sV , sB , sF , hV , hB) | ∀sF ′ ∈ StoresF (XF ).
(sV , sB , sF [sF
′], hV , hB) ∈ r}.
where sS [sS ′] denotes the update of sS by sS ′ defined
by:
sS [sS
′](y) ,

sS
′(y) if y ∈ dom(sS ′),
sS(y) if y ∈ dom(sS),
undefined otherwise.
Hence, we have that:
ModifyS(C) ∩ FV(r) = ∅ holds iff r = ∀XS .r.
The Semantic Version of the Frame Rule:
{p} − {q}
{p ∗ r} − {q ∗ r} r = ∀XS .r
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where XS range over XV , XB , and XF .
Theorem 6.1 (Soundness of the Frame Rule). The Frame Rule
is sound for both partial and total correctness.
Proof 6.1.
The proof uses the local properties which are from [28],
where some similar properties are shown.
Lemma 6.1 (Safety and Termination Monotonicity).
1 If 〈C, σ〉 is safe, and hV #hV ′, hB#hB ′,
then 〈C, (sV , sB , sF , hV ∗ hV ′, hB ∗ hB ′)〉 is safe.
2 If 〈C, σ〉 must terminate, and hV #hV ′, hB#hB ′,
then 〈C, (sV , sB , sF , hV ∗ hV ′, hB ∗ hB ′)〉
must terminate.
Lemma 6.2 (Frame Property).
Suppose 〈C, (sV , sB , sF , h0V , h0B)〉 is safe and
〈C, (sV , sB , sF , h0V ∗ h1V , h0B ∗ h1B)〉 ∗
(sV
′, sB ′, sF ′, hV ′, hB ′), then there are h0V
′
, h0B
′,
where 〈C, (sV , sB , sF , h0V , h0B)〉 ∗ (sV , sB , sF , h0V ′,
h0B
′
) and hV
′ = h0V
′ ∗ h1V , hB ′ = h0B ′ ∗ h1B .
Lemma 6.3 (Write Locality).
If 〈C, σ〉 ∗ (sV ′, sB ′, sF ′, hV ′, hB ′), and
x /∈ ModifyS(C), then sS(x) = sS ′(x).
We deal with the soundness of the Frame Rule for BCSSs
in the following:
(1) For partial correctness:
We will show {p∗r}C{q∗r} is true. By the interpretation
of partial correctness, we have:
{p ∗ r}C{q ∗ r} is true iff for ∀(sV , sB , sF , hV , hB).
if σ |= p ∗ r then
1.〈C, σ〉 is safe and
2. if 〈C, σ〉 ∗ (sV ′, sB ′, sF ′, hV ′, hB ′)
then (sV ′, sB ′, sF ′, hV ′, hB ′) |= q ∗ r
Pick a state σ, suppose σ |= p ∗ r, by the definition of “ ∗
”, we have:
σ |= p ∗ r iff
there exists h1H , h
2
H with h
1
H#h
2
H and hH = h
1
H ∗h2H
such that sV , sB , sF , h1V , h
1
B |= p and
sV , sB , sF , h
2
V , h
2
B |= r;
where hiH range over h
i
V and h
i
B and i = 1, 2.
By the premise of the frame rule, we have {p}C{q} is
true,
{p}C{q} is true iff for ∀(sV , sB , sF , h1V , h1B).
if (sV , sB , sF , h1V , h
1
B) |= p then
1.〈C, (sV , sB , sF , h1V , h1B)〉 is safe and
2. if 〈C, (sV , sB , sF , h1V , h1B)〉 ∗ (sV ′, sB ′, sF ′,
h1V
′
, h1B
′
) then (sV ′, sB ′, sF ′, h1V
′
, h1B
′
) |= q
By Lemma 1.(1) since 〈C, (sV , sB , sF , h1V , h1B)〉 is safe,
〈C, (sV , sB , sF ,
hV , hB)〉 is safe, where hV = h1V ∗h2V and hB = h1B ∗h2B .
By Lemma 2, now we have that 〈C, (sV , sB , sF , h1V , h1B)〉
is safe, and 〈C, (sV , sB , sF , h1V ∗ h2V , h1B ∗
h2B)〉  ∗ (sV ′, sB ′, sF ′, hV ′, hB ′), then there exit
h1V
′
, h1B
′ such that 〈C, (sV , sB , sF , h1V , h1B)〉  ∗
(sV
′, sB ′, sF ′, h1V
′
, h1B
′
).
We will show that (sV ′, sB ′, sF ′, hV ′, hB ′) |= q ∗ r:
(sV
′, sB ′, sF ′, hV ′, hB ′) |= q ∗ r iff
there exist h1H
′
, h2H with h
1
H
′
#h2H and hH = h
1
H
′ ∗ h2H
such that (sV ′, sB ′, sF ′, h1V
′
, h1B
′
) |= q and
(sV
′, sB ′, sF ′, h2V , h
2
B) |= r;
Now we have that (sV ′, sB ′, sF ′, h1V
′
, h1B
′
) |= q. By
Lemma 6.3 since (sV , sB , sF , h2V , h
2
B) |= r and r =
∀XS .r, we obtain that (sV ′, sB ′, sF ′, h2V , h2B) |= r.
Hence, we find the heaps h1H
′
, h2H with h
1
H
′
#h2H and
hH = h
1
H
′ ∗ h2H such that (sV ′, sB ′, sF ′, h1V ′, h1B ′) |= q
and (sV ′, sB ′, sF ′, h2V , h
2
B) |= r.
Therefore, (sV ′, sB ′, sF ′, hV ′, hB ′) |= q ∗ r, Theorem 1 is
proved.
(2) The case for total correctness can be handled simi-
larly, the only difference is to use the Termination Mono-
tonicity instead of the Safety Monotonicity.
7 AN ILLUSTRATING EXAMPLE
In this section, we will demonstrate how to use the ax-
ioms and rules by a practical example from Disk Balancer
(cf.Sect.2), which proves the correctness of Transfer algo-
rithm as follows. To make the action of the inference rules
clear, each assertion is given by the unabbreviated form.
Algorithm 1 Transfer
1: b1 := allocate(1011, 1012);
2: f := create(b1);
3: b2 := allocate();
4: function MOVE( )
5: i := 1;
6: while i <= #b1 do
7: x := {b1.i};
8: append(b2, x);
9: i := i+ 1;
10: end while
11: end function
12: f.1 := b2;
13: delete b1;
Here is the full proof.
1{〈empV , empB〉} (Given)
b1 := allocate(1011, 1012);
{∃l¯.〈l¯# (1011, 1012), b1 7→ l¯〉} (A10)
2{∃b1′.〈trueV , b1 == b1′ ∧ b1′ # b1′〉} (1)
3{∃b1′.〈trueV , b1 == b1′ ∧ b1′ # b1′〉}
f := create(b1);
{∃b1′.〈trueV , f = (b1) ∧ b1 == b1′ ∧ b1′ # b1′〉} (2, A7)
4{∃b1′.〈trueV , f = (b1) ∧ b1 == b1′ ∧ b1′ # b1′〉}
b2 := allocate();
{∃b1′, b2′.〈trueV , f = (b1) ∧ b1 == b1′ ∧ b2 == b2′ ∧ b1′ # b1′ ∗ b2′ # nil〉}
(3, A10)
After the executing of while-loop, the content of b2
should be its initial content followed by the content of b1,
or formally:
{∃b1′, b2′.〈trueV , b1 == b1′ ∧ b2 == b2′ ∧ b1′ # b1′ ∗ b2′ # nil〉}
i := 1;while be do C
′
;
{∃b1′, b2′.〈trueV , b1 == b1′ ∧ b2 == b2′ ∧ trueB ∗ b2′ # b1′〉}
We are proving the correctness of the Move function step
by step. After the first command i := 1, a complicated
condition is obtained from the initial condition and some
unnecessary conditions is omitted in the loop.
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5{∃b1′, b2′.〈1 ≤ #b1 + 1 ∧#nil = 0 ∧ trueV , b1 == (nil,nil)~ b1′∧
b2 == b2
′ ~ (nil,nil) ∧ b1′ # b1′ ∗ b2′ # nil〉} (4)
6{∃b3, b4, b5.〈1 ≤ #b1 + 1 ∧#b3 = 0 ∧#b4 = #b1 ∧ trueV , b1 ==
b3 ~ b4 ∧ b2 == b5 ∧ trueB ∗ b4 # b4 ∗ b5 # b3〉} (5)
7{∃b3, b4, b5.〈1 ≤ #b1 + 1 ∧#b3 = 0 ∧#b4 = #b1 ∧ trueV , b1 ==
b3 ~ b4 ∧ b2 == b5 ∧ trueB ∗ b4 # b4 ∗ b5 # b3〉}
i := 1;
{∃b3, b4, b5.〈i ≤ #b1 + 1 ∧#b3 = i− 1 ∧#b4 = #b1 − i+ 1 ∧ trueV ,
b1 == b3 ~ b4 ∧ b2 == b5 ∧ trueB ∗ b4 # b4 ∗ b5 # b3〉} (6, A2)
The next command is a while-loop. To use the rule of
while-loops (R3), we need to find the loop invariant first.
Let A ≡ ∃b3, b4, b5.〈i ≤ #b1 + 1 ∧#b3 = i− 1 ∧#b4 = #b1 − i+ 1∧
trueV , b1 == b3 ~ b4 ∧ b2 == b5 ∧ trueB ∗ b4 # b4 ∗ b5 # b3〉,
be ≡ i ≤ #b1,
C
′ ≡ x := {b1.i}; append(b2, x); i := i+ 1;
Here b4 means the block content copied, b5 means the
rest block content. We will prove A is the loop invariant in
the following, i.e. {A ∧ T (be)} C ′ {A}.
8A ∧ T (be) = {∃b3, b4, b5.〈i ≤ #b1 ∧#b3 = i− 1 ∧#b4 = #b1 − i+ 1
∧ trueV , b1 == b3 ~ b4 ∧ b2 == b5 ∧ trueB ∗ b4 # b4 ∗ b5 # b3〉}
9{∃b3, b5, b6, b7, l, y.〈i ≤ #b1 ∧#b3 = i− 1 ∧#b7 = #b1 − i+ 1− 1∧
trueV ∗ l 7→ y, b1 == b3 ~ b6 ~ b7 ∧ b2 == b5 ∧ trueB ∗ b6 7→ (l)∗
b7 # b7 ∗ b5 # b3〉} (8)
10{∃b3, b5, b6, b7, l, y.〈i ≤ #b1 ∧#b3 = i− 1 ∧#b7 = #b1 − i+ 1− 1
∧ trueV ∗ l 7→ y, b1 == b3 ~ b6 ~ b7 ∧ b2 == b5 ∧ trueB ∗ b6 7→ (l)∗
b7 # b7 ∗ b5 # b3〉}
x := {b1.i};
{∃b3, b5, b6, b7, l, y.〈i ≤ #b1 ∧#b3 = i− 1 ∧#b7 = #b1 − i+ 1− 1∧
x = y ∧ trueV ∗ l 7→ y, b1 == b3 ~ b6 ~ b7 ∧ b2 == b5 ∧ trueB ∗ b6 7→
(l) ∗ b7 # b7 ∗ b5 # b3〉} (9, A12)
11{∃b3, b5, b6, b7, l, y.〈i ≤ #b1 ∧#b3 = i− 1 ∧#b7 = #b1 − i+ 1− 1
∧ x = y ∧ trueV ∗ l 7→ y, b1 == b3 ~ b6 ~ b7 ∧ b2 == b5 ∧ trueB ∗ b6
7→ (l) ∗ b7 # b7 ∗ b5 # b3〉}
append(b2, x);
{∃b3, b5, b6, b7, b8, l, l′, y.〈i ≤ #b1 ∧#b3 = i− 1 ∧#b7 = #b1 − i+ 1
− 1 ∧ x = y ∧ trueV ∗ l 7→ y ∗ l′ 7→ y, b1 == b3 ~ b6 ~ b7 ∧ b2 == b5
~ b8 ∧ trueB ∗ b6 7→ (l) ∗ b7 # b7 ∗ b5 # b3 ∗ b8 7→ (l′)〉} (10, A11)
12{∃b3, b6, b7, b9, l, l′, y.〈i ≤ #b1 ∧#b3 = i− 1 ∧#b7 = #b1 − i+ 1
− 1 ∧ trueV ∗ l 7→ y ∗ l′ 7→ y, b1 == b3 ~ b6 ~ b7 ∧ b2 == b9 ∧ trueB
∗ b3 # b3 ∗ b6 7→ (l) ∗ b7 # b7 ∗ b9 7→ (l′)〉} (11)
13{∃b7, b9, b10, l, l′, y.〈i ≤ #b1 ∧#b10 = i− 1 + 1 ∧#b7 = #b1 − i+
1− 1 ∧ trueV ∗ l 7→ y ∗ l′ 7→ y, b1 == b10 ~ b7 ∧ b2 == b9 ∧ trueB∗
b10 7→ (l) ∗ b7 # b7 ∗ b9 7→ (l′)〉} (12)
14{∃b7, b9, b10.〈i ≤ #b1 ∧#b10 = i− 1 + 1 ∧#b7 = #b1 − i+ 1− 1∧
trueV , b1 == b10 ~ b7 ∧ b2 == b9 ∧ trueB ∗ b7 # b7 ∗ b9 # b10〉} (13)
15{∃b7, b9, b10.〈i ≤ #b1 ∧#b10 = i− 1 + 1 ∧#b7 = #b1 − i+ 1− 1
∧ trueV , b1 == b10 ~ b7 ∧ b2 == b9 ∧ trueB ∗ b7 # b7 ∗ b9 # b10〉}
i := i+ 1;
{∃b7, b9, b10.〈i ≤ #b1 + 1 ∧#b10 = i− 1 ∧#b7 = #b1 − i+ 1 ∧ trueV ,
b1 == b10 ~ b7 ∧ b2 == b9 ∧ trueB ∗ b7 # b7 ∗ b9 # b10〉} (14, A2)
16{∃b3, b4, b5.〈i ≤ #b1 + 1 ∧#b3 = i− 1 ∧#b4 = #b1 − i+ 1 ∧ trueV ,
b1 == b3 ~ b4 ∧ b2 == b5 ∧ trueB ∗ b4 # b4 ∗ b5 # b3〉} (15)
Notice that, {∃b3, b4, b5.〈i ≤ #b1 + 1 ∧ #b3 = i − 1 ∧
#b4 = #b1 − i + 1 ∧ trueV , b1 == b3 ~ b4 ∧ b2 == b5 ∧
trueB ∗ b4 # b4 ∗ b5 # b3〉} in 16 is A itself. So we prove
that {A ∧ T (be)} C ′ {A}. By the rule of while-loops (R3),
{A} while be do C ′ {A ∧ ¬T (be)} is acquired.
17A ∧ ¬T (be) = ∃b3, b4, b5.〈i = #b1 + 1 ∧#b3 = i− 1 ∧#b4 = #b1−
i+ 1 ∧ trueV , b1 == b3 ~ b4 ∧ b2 == b5 ∧ trueB ∗ b4 # b4 ∗ b5 # b3〉
18{∃b3, b4, b5.〈i ≤ #b1 + 1 ∧#b3 = i− 1 ∧#b4 = #b1 − i+ 1 ∧ trueV ,
b1 == b3 ~ b4 ∧ b2 == b5 ∧ trueB ∗ b4 # b4 ∗ b5 # b3〉}
while be do C
′
;
{∃b3, b4, b5.〈i = #b1 + 1 ∧#b3 = i− 1 ∧#b4 = #b1 − i+ 1 ∧ trueV ,
b1 == b3 ~ b4 ∧ b2 == b5 ∧ trueB ∗ b4 # b4 ∗ b5 # b3〉} (8-16, R3)
From the while-loop, we know i = #b1 + 1 when it
finished. The following conclusions is obtained from 18 and
the correctness of the Move function is proven.
19{∃b3, b4, b5.〈i = #b1 + 1 ∧#b3 = #b1 ∧#b4 = 0 ∧ trueV , b1 == b3
~ b4 ∧ b2 == b5 ∧ trueB ∗ b4 # b4 ∗ b5 # b3〉} (18)
20{∃b3, b5.〈i = #b1 + 1 ∧#b3 = #b1 ∧ trueV , b1 == b3 ∧ b2 == b5∧
trueB ∗ b5 # b3〉} (19)
21{∃b1′, b2′.〈trueV , b1 == b1′ ∧ b2 == b2′ ∧ trueB ∗ b2′ # b1′〉} (20)
After the Move function, using the axioms A15 and A17,
the final result can be obtained.
22{∃b1′, b2′.〈trueV , f = (b1) ∧ b1 == b1′ ∧ b2 == b2′ ∧ trueB ∗ b2′ #
b1
′〉} (4, 21)
23{∃b1′, b2′.〈trueV , f = (b1) ∧ b1 == b1′ ∧ b2 == b2′ ∧ trueB ∗ b2′ #
b1
′〉}
f.1 := b2;
{∃b1′, b2′.〈trueV , f = (b2) ∧ b1 == b1′ ∧ b2 == b2′ ∧ trueB ∗ b2′ # b1′
〉} (22, A15)
24{∃l¯, l¯′.〈l¯# (1011, 1012) ∗ l¯′ # (1011, 1012), f = (b2) ∧ b1 7→ l¯ ∗ b2 7→
l¯′〉} (1, 23)
25{∃l¯, l¯′.〈l¯# (1011, 1012) ∗ l¯′ # (1011, 1012), f = (b2) ∧ b1 7→ l¯ ∗ b2 7→
l¯′〉}
delete b1;
{∃l¯, l¯′.〈l¯# (1011, 1012) ∗ l¯′ # (1011, 1012), f = (b2) ∧ b2 7→ l¯′〉}
(24, A17)
With all 1-25 and the rule of composition (R1), the
correctness of Transfer Algorithm is proven.
8 CONCLUSION
To insure reliability of block operations in BCSSs and reduce
the complexity of the block-based storage structure and at
the same time refine the block content, a verification frame-
work based on SL is introduced to prove the correctness
of BCSSs management programs. The framework is con-
structed by introducing a novel two-tier heap structure, and
a defined modeling language. Moreover, assertions based on
SL is constructed to describe the properties of BCSSs. Then a
proof system with Hoare-style specifications is proposed to
reason about the BCSSs. Using these methods, an example of
practical algorithm with while-loop is verified. The results
show that the proving process is scientific and correct.
Future work will focus on the following directions: (1)
Consider more characteristics of BCSSs, such as parallelism,
(key,value) pairs and the relations between blocks and lo-
cations. (2) Investigate the expressiveness, decidability and
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model checking algorithms of assertions. (3) Find out highly
efficient proof strategies by selecting adaptive bi-abduction
rules to improve the usability of our proof system.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work is supported by the National Key R&D
Program of China under Grants 2017YFB1103602 and
2018YFB1003904, the National Natural Science Founda-
tion of China under Grants 61572003, 61772035, 61751210,
61972005 and 61932001, and the Major State Research Devel-
opment Program of China under Grant 2016QY04W0804.
REFERENCES
[1] Apache Software Foundation.: Rebalance data blocks when new
data nodes added or data nodes become full - ASF JIRA, (2019).
https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HADOOP-1652
[2] Josh Berdine, Cristiano Calcagno, and Peter W O’hearn.: Symbolic
execution with separation logic. In: Asian Symposium on Program-
ming Languages and Systems, pages 52–68. Springer, (2005).
[3] Lars Birkedal, Noah Torp-Smith, and John C Reynolds.: Local
reasoning about a copying garbage collector. In: ACM SIGPLAN
Notices, volume 39, pages 220–231. ACM, (2004).
[4] James Brotherston, Nikos Gorogiannis, and Max Kanovich.: Biab-
duction (and related problems) in array separation logic. In: Inter-
national Conference on Automated Deduction, pages 472–490. Springer,
(2017).
[5] James Brotherston, Nikos Gorogiannis, Max Kanovich, and Reuben
Rowe.: Model checking for symbolic-heap separation logic with
inductive predicates. ACM SIGPLAN Notices, 51(1):84–96, (2016).
[6] Mike Dodds, Xinyu Feng, Matthew Parkinson, and Viktor
Vafeiadis.: Deny-guarantee reasoning. In: European Symposium on
Programming, pages 363–377. Springer, (2009).
[7] Victor R Basili and Douglas D Dunlop.: A comparative analysis
of functional correctness. In: ACM Computing Surveys, volume 14,
pages 229–244. ACM, (1980).
[8] S. Ghemawat, H. Gobioff, and S. Leung.: The google file system.
In: Proceedings of the 19th ACM Symposium on Operating Systems
Principles, 29–43, (2003).
[9] Ibrahim Abaker Targio Hashem, Ibrar Yaqoob, Nor Badrul Anuar,
Salimah Mokhtar, Abdullah Gani, and Samee Ullah Khan.: The
rise of “big data” on cloud computing: Review and open research
issues. Information Systems, 47:98–115, (2015).
[10] Samin S Ishtiaq and Peter W O’hearn.: Bi as an assertion language
for mutable data structures. ACM SIGPLAN Notices, 36(3):14–26,
(2001).
[11] Julian James Stephen, Savvas Savvides, Russell Seidel, and Patrick
Eugster.: Program analysis for secure big data processing. In: Pro-
ceedings of the 29th ACM/IEEE international conference on Automated
software engineering, pages 277–288. ACM, (2014).
[12] Zhao Jin, Hanpin Wang, Lei Zhang, Bowen Zhang, Kun
Gao, and Yongzhi Cao.: Reasoning about Block-based
Cloud Storage Systems. arXiv:1904.04442 [cs.LO] (2019).
https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.04442
[13] Yuxin Jing, Hanpin Wang, Yu Huang, Lei Zhang, Jiang Xu, and
Yongzhi Cao.: A modeling language to describe massive data
storage management in cyber-physical systems. Journal of Parallel
and Distributed Computing, 103:113–120, (2017).
[14] Ralf Jung, David Swasey, Filip Sieczkowski, Kasper Svendsen,
Aaron Turon, Lars Birkedal, and Derek Dreyer.: Iris: Monoids and
invariants as an orthogonal basis for concurrent reasoning. In: ACM
SIGPLAN Notices, volume 50, pages 637–650. ACM, (2015).
[15] Morten Krogh-Jespersen, Kasper Svendsen, and Lars Birkedal.:
A relational model of types-and-effects in higher-order concurrent
separation logic. In: ACM SIGPLAN Notices, volume 52, pages 218–
231. ACM, (2017).
[16] Quang Loc Le, Makoto Tatsuta, Jun Sun, and Wei-Ngan Chin.: A
decidable fragment in separation logic with inductive predicates
and arithmetic. In: International Conference on Computer Aided Verifi-
cation, pages 495–517. Springer, (2017).
[17] Wonyeol Lee and Sungwoo Park.: A proof system for separation
logic with magic wand. In: ACM SIGPLAN Notices, volume 49,
pages 477–490. ACM, (2014).
[18] Gian Ntzik and Philippa Gardner.: Reasoning about the posix file
system: Local update and global pathnames. In: ACM SIGPLAN
Notices, volume 50, pages 201–220. ACM, (2015).
[19] Peter O’Hearn, John Reynolds, and Hongseok Yang.: Local rea-
soning about programs that alter data structures. In: International
Workshop on Computer Science Logic, pages 1–19. Springer, (2001).
[20] Inna Pereverzeva, Linas Laibinis, Elena Troubitsyna, Markus
Holmberg, and Mikko Po¨ri.: Formal modelling of resilient data
storage in cloud. In: International Conference on Formal Engineering
Methods, pages 363–379. Springer, (2013).
[21] David Pym, Jonathan M Spring, and Peter O’Hearn.: Why separa-
tion logic works. Philosophy & Technology, pages 1–34, (2018).
[22] John C Reynolds.: Separation logic: A logic for shared mutable
data structures. In: Proceedings 17th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic
in Computer Science, pages 55–74. IEEE, (2002).
[23] Konstantin Shvachko, Hairong Kuang, Sanjay Radia, and Robert
Chansler.: The hadoop distributed file system. In: 2010 IEEE 26th
symposium on mass storage systems and technologies, pages 1–10. IEEE,
(2010).
[24] Kasper Svendsen and Lars Birkedal.: Impredicative concurrent ab-
stract predicates. In: European Symposium on Programming Languages
and Systems, pages 149–168. Springer, (2014).
[25] Quang-Trung Ta, Ton Chanh Le, Siau-Cheng Khoo, and Wei-Ngan
Chin.: Automated mutual explicit induction proof in separation
logic. In: International Symposium on Formal Methods, pages 659–676.
Springer, (2016).
[26] Hanpin Wang, Zhao Jin, Lei Zhang, Yuxin Jing, and Yongzhi
Cao.: Reasoning about cloud storage systems. In: 2018 IEEE Third
International Conference on Data Science in Cyberspace, pages 107–114.
IEEE, (2018).
[27] Glynn Winskel.: The formal semantics of programming languages: an
introduction. MIT press, (1993).
[28] Yang H.: Local Reasoning for Stateful Programs. PhD thesis, Univer-
sity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, (2001).
[29] Hongseok Yang and Peter O’Hearn.: A semantic basis for local
reasoning. In: International Conference on Foundations of Software
Science and Computation Structures, pages 402–416. Springer, (2002).
[30] Hoare, Charles Antony Richard.: An axiomatic basis for computer
programming. Communications of the ACM, pages 576–580, (1969).
[31] Dean, Jeffrey and Ghemawat, Sanjay.: MapReduce: simplified data
processing on large clusters. Communications of the ACM, pages 107–
113, (2008).
[32] CNN Business.: Amazon broke the internet with a typo [EB/OL],
(2017). https://money.cnn.com/2017/03/02/technology/amazon-
s3-outage-human-error/index.html
[33] Hesselink, Wim H and Lali, Muhammad Ikram.: Formalizing a
hierarchical file system. Formal Aspects of Computing, pages 27–44,
(2012).
13
APPENDIX A
A SEMANTIC EXAMPLE
We will use our modeling language to write a program that
tries to create and copy a file. First, we create a file f1 with a
sole block b1, which value is (1011, 1012). Then we create a
new empty block b2, which later is appended with content
of file b1 one by one in the while-loop. Finally, we create
a new empty file f2, and attach the block b2 to it. When
it is finished, we got a file f1 and its copy f2. Note that
we cannot change the order of command L2 and L2 since
that the semantics of f := create(bk1, ..., bkn) request that
the term of sequence determined by hB(JbkiKσ) belong to
dom(hV ).
Algorithm 2 Copy a File
1: function COPY( )
2: b1 := allocate(1011, 1012);
3: f1 := create(b1);
4: b2 := allocate();
5: i := 1;
6: while i <= #b1 do
7: x := {b1.i};
8: append(b2, x)
9: i := i+ 1;
10: end while
11: f2 := create();
12: attach(f2, b2);
13: end function
We try to use the denotational semantics to analyze the
sample program Algorithm 1. Assume the initial state is
(sF , sB , sV , hB , hV ), after the execution, we can get a final
state.
For convenience, we use label Ln to express the com-
mand in line n of the Algorithm 1, as an example, L3 is the
command b1 := allocate(1011, 1012);. Also, we use W to
express the while loop part of the program. So there is:
JL2;L3;L4;L5;W;L11;L12K(sF , sB , sV , hB , hV )
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(JL5K(JL4K(JL3K(JL2K(sF , sB , sV , hB , hV )))))))
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(JL5K(JL4K(JL3K(Jb1 := allocate(1011, 1012)K(sF ,
sB , sV , hB , hV )))))))
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(JL5K(JL4K(JL3K(sF , sB [bloc1/b1], sV , hB [(loc11,
loc12)/bloc1], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 : 1012]))))))
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(JL5K(JL4K(Jf1 := create(b1)K(sF , sB [bloc1/b1], sV ,
hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 : 1012]))))))
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(JL5K(JL4K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1], sV , hB
[(loc11, loc12)/bloc1], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 : 1012])))))
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(JL5K(Jb2 := allocate()K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/
b1], sV , hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 : 1012])))))
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(JL5K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV ,
hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][nil/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 : 1012]))))
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(Ji := 1K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV ,
hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][nil/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 : 1012]))))
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV [1/i], hB
[(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][nil/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 : 1012])))
Now we have got an intermediate state after executing
commands L2, L3, L4 and L5. Next, we will analyze the
while-loop codes.
For
Ji <= #b1K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV [1/i], hB [(loc11,
loc12)/bloc1][nil/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 : 1012])
= J1 <= 2K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV [1/i], hB [(loc11,
loc12)/bloc1][nil/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 : 1012])
= true
Thus
JL12K(JL11K(JWK(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV [1/i], hB
[(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][nil/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 : 1012])))
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(JL9K(JL8K(JL7K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1]
[bloc2/b2], sV [1/i], hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][nil/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011,
loc12 : 1012]))))))
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(JL9K(JL8K(Jx := {b1.i}K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1
/b1][bloc2/b2], sV [1/i], hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][nil/bloc2], [hV |loc11 :
1011, loc12 : 1012]))))))
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(JL9K(JL8K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2],
sV [1/i][1011/x], hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][nil/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011,
loc12 : 1012])))))
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(JL9K(Jappend(b2, x)K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/
b1][bloc2/b2], sV [1/i][1011/x], hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][nil/bloc2], [hV |
loc11 : 1011, loc12 : 1012])))))
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(JL9K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV
[1/i][1011/x], hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21)/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011,
loc12 : 1012, loc21 : 1011]))))
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(Ji := i+ 1K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2],
sV [1/i][1011/x], hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21)/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011,
loc12 : 1012, loc21 : 1011]))))
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV [2/i][1011
/x], hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21)/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 : 1012,
loc21 : 1011])))
After the first loop of the while-loop command, block b2
has copied the first content of b1. And the index variable i
equals 2. Therefore, the second loop will be started.
For
Ji <= #b1K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV [2/i][1011/x], hB [
(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21)/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 : 1012, loc21 :
1011])
= J2 <= 2K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV [2/i][1011/x], hB [
(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21)/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 : 1012, loc21 :
1011])
= true
Thus
JL12K(JL11K(JWK(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV [2/i][1011
/x], hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21)/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 : 1012,
loc21 : 1011])))
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(JL9K(JL8K(JL7K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2
/b2], sV [2/i][1011/x], hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21)/bloc2], [hV |loc11 :
1011, loc12 : 1012, loc21 : 1011]))))))
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(JL9K(JL8K(Jx := {b1.i}K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/
b1][bloc2/b2], sV [2/i][1011/x], hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21)/bloc2], [hV
|loc11 : 1011, loc12 : 1012, loc21 : 1011]))))))
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(JL9K(JL8K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2],
sV [2/i][1012/x], hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21)/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011,
loc12 : 1012, loc21 : 1011])))))
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= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(JL9K(Jappend(b2, x)K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1]
[bloc2/b2], sV [2/i][1012/x], hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21)/bloc2], [hV |
loc11 : 1011, loc12 : 1012, loc21 : 1011])))))
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(JL9K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV [2/
i][1012/x], hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21, loc22)/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011,
loc12 : 1012, loc21 : 1011, loc22 : 1012]))))
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(Ji := i+ 1K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2],
sV [2/i][1012/x], hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21, loc22)/bloc2], [hV |loc11 :
1011, loc12 : 1012, loc21 : 1011, loc22 : 1012]))))
= JL12K(JL11K(JWK(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV [3/i][1012
/x], hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21, (loc22)/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 :
1012, loc21 : 1011, loc22 : 1012])))
After the second loop, block b2 has copied the other
content of b1.Now the index variable i equals 3, which will
terminate the while-loop command.
For
Ji <= #b1K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV [3/i][1012/x], hB
[(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21, loc22)/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 : 1012,
loc21 : 1011, loc22 : 1012])
= J3 <= 2K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV [3/i][1012/x], hB
[(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21, loc22)/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 : 1012,
loc21 : 1011, loc22 : 1012])
= false
Thus
JL12K(JL11K(JWK(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV [3/i][1012/
x], hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21, loc22)/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 :
1012, loc21 : 1011, loc22 : 1012])))
= JL12K(JL11K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV [3/i][1012/x],
hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21, loc22)/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 :
1012, loc21 : 1011, loc22 : 1012]))
= JL12K(Jf2 := create()K(sF [(bloc1)/f1], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV [3/
i][1012/x], hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21, loc22)/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011,
loc12 : 1012, loc21 : 1011, loc22 : 1012]))
= JL12K(sF [(bloc1)/f1][nil/f2], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV [3/i][1012/x],
hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21, loc22)/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 :
1012, loc21 : 1011, loc22 : 1012])
= Jattach(f2, b2)K(sF [(bloc1)/f1][nil/f2], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV [3/
i][1012/x], hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21, loc22)/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011,
loc12 : 1012, loc21 : 1011, loc22 : 1012])
= (sF [(bloc1)/f1][(bloc2)/f2], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV [3/i][1012/x],
hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21, loc22)/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 :
1012, loc21 : 1011, loc22 : 1012])
Hence
JL2;L3;L4;L5;W;L11;L12K(sF , sB , sV , hB , hV )
= (sF [(bloc1)/f1][(bloc2)/f2], sB [bloc1/b1][bloc2/b2], sV [3/i][1012/x],
hB [(loc11, loc12)/bloc1][(loc21, loc22)/bloc2], [hV |loc11 : 1011, loc12 :
1012, loc21 : 1011, loc22 : 1012])
Finally, the program is terminated, and we got a final
state.
APPENDIX B
SOUNDNESS OF THE SPECIFICATION AXIOMS
The soundness of axioms can be proved in denotational
semantics by case:
Location Commands:
• SkipJskipKσ = σ
σ |= p
σ |= p
• The Simple Assignment form (SA)Jx := eKσ = (sF , sB , sV [JeKσ/x], hB , hV )
let sV ′ ≡ sV [JeKσ/x]
σ |= 〈x = x′ ∧ empV , empB〉
σ |= x = x′ ∧ empV and σ |= empBJxKσ = Jx′Kσ, dom(hV ) = {}, and dom(hB) = {}
dom(hV ) = {}∧
sV
′(x) = Je[x′/x]K(sF , sB , sV ′, hB) and dom(hB) = {}
sF , sB , sV
′, hB , hV |= x = e[x′/x] ∧ empV and
sF , sB , sV
′, hB , hV |= empB
sF , sB , sV
′, hB , hV |= 〈x = e[x′/x] ∧ empV , empB〉
• The Location Allocation form (LA)Jx := cons(e¯)Kσ = (sF , sB , sV [loc/x], hB , [hV |loc :Je1Kσ|...|loc+ n− 1 : JenKσ])
where loc, ..., loc+ n− 1 ∈ Loc− dom(hV )
let sV ′ ≡ sV [loc/x] and hV ′ ≡ hV |loc : Je1Kσ|...|loc +
n− 1 : JenKσ, then:
σ |= 〈x = x′ ∧ empV , empB〉
σ |= x = x′ ∧ empV and σ |= empBJxKσ = Jx′Kσ, dom(hV ) = {}, and dom(hB) = {}JxKσ = Jx′Kσ, dom(hV ′) = {loc, ..., loc+ n− 1}, hV ′(loc) =Je1Kσ ∧ ... ∧ hV ′(loc+ n− 1) = JenKσ, and dom(hB) = {}
dom(hV ′) = {loc, ..., loc+ n− 1}, hV ′(loc) = Je1[x′/x]K
(sF , sB , sV
′, hB) ∧ ... ∧ hV ′(loc+ n− 1) = Jen[x′/x]K
(sF , sB , sV
′, hB) and sV ′(x) = loc and dom(hB) = {}
dom(hV ′) = {loc, ..., loc+ n− 1} ∧ hV ′(loc) = Je1[x′/x]K
(sF , sB , sV
′, hB) ∧ ... ∧ hV ′(loc+ n− 1) = Jen[x′/x]K
(sF , sB , sV
′, hB) and sV ′(x) = loc and dom(hB) = {}
sF , sB , sV
′, hB , hV ′ |= x 7→ e1[x′/x], ..., en[x′/x] and
sF , sB , sV
′, hB , hV ′ |= empB
sF , sB , sV
′, hB , hV ′ |= 〈x 7→ e1[x′/x], ..., en[x′/x], empB〉
• The Location Lookup form (LL)Jx := [e]Kσ = (sF , sB , sV [hV (JeKσ)/x], hB , hV )
let sV ′ ≡ sV [hV (JeKσ)/x], then:
σ |= 〈x = x′ ∧ e 7→ x′′, empB〉
σ |= x = x′ ∧ e 7→ x′′ and σ |= empBJxKσ = Jx′Kσ, dom(hV ) = {JeKσ}, hV (JeKσ) = Jx′′Kσ, and
dom(hB) = {}
dom(hV ) = {Je[x′/x]K(sF , sB , sV ′, hB)},
hV (Je[x′/x]K(sF , sB , sV ′, hB)) = Jx′′Kσ, and dom(hB) = {}JxK(sF , sB , sV ′, hB , hV ) = hV (JeKσ) = Jx′′K(sF , sB , sV ′, hB , hV ),
dom(hV ) = {Je[x′/x]K(sF , sB , sV ′, hB , hV )},
hV (Je[x′/x]K(sF , sB , sV ′, hB , hV )) = Jx′′K(sF , sB , sV ′, hB , hV ),
and dom(hB) = {}
sF , sB , sV
′, hB , hV |= x = x′′ ∧ e[x′/x] 7→ x′′ and
sF , sB , sV
′, hB , hV |= empB
sF , sB , sV
′, hB , hV |= 〈x = x′′ ∧ e[x′/x] 7→ x′′, β〉
• The Location Mutation form (LM)J[e] := e′Kσ = (sF , sB , sV , hB , hV [Je′Kσ/JeKσ])
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let hV
′ ≡ hV [Je′Kσ/JeKσ], then:
The soundness of axioms can be proved in denotational
semantics by case:
σ |= 〈e 7→ −, empB〉
σ |= e 7→ − and σ |= empB
dom(hV ) = {JeKσ} and dom(hB) = {}
dom(hV ′) = {JeKσ} and hV ′(JeKσ) = Je′Kσ and dom(hB) = {}
sF , sB , sV , hB , hV
′ |= e 7→ e′ and sF , sB , sV , hB , hV ′ |= empB
sF , sB , sV , hB , hV
′ |= 〈e 7→ e′, empB〉
• The Deallocation form (DL)Jdispose eKσ = (sF , sB , sV , hB , hV e(dom(hV ) −
{JeKσ}))
let hV
′ ≡ hV e(dom(hV )− {JeKσ}, then:
σ |= 〈e 7→ −, empB〉
σ |= e 7→ − and σ |= empB
dom(hV ) = {JeKσ} and dom(hB) = {}
dom(hV ′) = {JeKσ} − {JeKσ} = {} and dom(hB) = {}
sF , sB , sV , hB , hV
′ |= empV and sF , sB , sV , hB , hV ′ |= empB
sF , sB , sV , hB , hV
′ |= 〈empV , empB〉
File Commands
• The File Creation form (FC)Jf := create(bk∗)Kσ = (sF [(Jbk1Kσ, ..., JbknKσ)/f ], sB ,
sV , hB , hV )
where the term of sequence determined by
hB(JbkiKσ) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) belong to dom(hV ).
let sF ′ ≡ sF [(Jbk1Kσ, ..., JbknKσ)/f ], as f does not ap-
pear in α or bk1, ..., bkn, so we have:
σ |= 〈α, f = nil ∧ β〉
σ |= α, σ |= f = nil, and σ |= β
σ |= α, JfKσ = JnilKσ, and σ |= β
sF
′, sB , sV , hB , hV |= α, sF ′(f) = (Jbk1K(sF ′, sB , sV , hB),
..., JbknK(sF ′, sB , sV , hB)) and σ |= β
sF
′, sB , sV , hB , hV |= α and
sF
′, sB , sV , hB , hV |= β[(bk1, ..., bkn)/f ]
sF
′, sB , sV , hB , hV |= 〈α, β[(bk1, ..., bkn)/f ]〉
• The Block Address Appending form (BAA)Jattach(f, bk∗)Kσ = (sF [(sF (f)  (Jbk1Kσ, ..., JbknKσ))
/f ], sB , sV , hB , hV )
where the term of sequence determined by hB(JbkiKσ)
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) belong to dom(hV ).
let sF ′ ≡ sF [(sF (f)  (Jbk1Kσ, ..., JbknKσ))/f ], then:
σ |= 〈α, f = f ′ ∧ β〉
σ |= α, σ |= f = f ′, and σ |= β
σ |= α, JfKσ = Jf ′Kσ, and σ |= β
sF
′, sB , sV , hB , hV |= α[f ′/f ], σ |= β, and
sF
′(f) = (f ′  (Jbk1[f ′/f ]K(sF ′, sB , sV , hB),
..., Jbkn[f ′/f ]K(sF ′, sB , sV , hB)))
sF
′, sB , sV , hB , hV |= α[f ′/f ] and
sF
′, sB , sV , hB , hV |= β[f ′ · (bk1[f ′/f ], ..., bkn[f ′/f ])/f ]
sF
′, sB , sV , hB , hV |= 〈α[f ′/f ], β[f ′·
(bk1[f
′/f ], ..., bkn[f ′/f ])/f ]〉
• The File Deletion form (FD)Jdelete fK(sV , sB , sF , hB , hV ) = (sF [JnilKσ/f ], sB , sV ,
hB , hV )
let sF ′ ≡ sF [JnilKσ/f ], then:
σ |= 〈α, f = f ′ ∧ β〉
σ |= α, σ |= f = f ′, and σ |= β
σ |= α, JfKσ = Jf ′Kσ, and σ |= β
sF
′, sB , sV , hB , hV |= α[f ′/f ], sF ′(f) = (JnilK
(sF
′, sB , sV , hB)), and σ |= β
sF
′, sB , sV , hB , hV |= α[f ′/f ] and
sF
′, sB , sV , hB , hV |= β[nil/f ]
sF
′, sB , sV , hB , hV |= 〈α[f ′/f ], β[nil/f ]〉
Block Commands
• The Block Allocation form (BA)
Jb := allocate(e¯)Kσ = (sF , sB [bloc/b], sV , hB [(loc1, ...,
locn)/bloc], [hV |loc1 : Je1Kσ, ..., locn : JenKσ])
where bloc ∈ BLoc−dom(hB) , and loc1, ..., locn ∈ Loc−
dom(hV )
let sB ′ ≡ sB [bloc/b], hB ′ = hB [(loc1, ..., locn)/bloc]
and hV
′ ≡ [hV |loc1 : Je1Kσ, ..., locn : JenKσ], where
bloc ∈ BLoc−dom(hB) , and loc1, ..., locn ∈ Loc−dom(hV ),
as b is not free in e1, ..., en, so we have:
σ |= 〈empV , empB〉
σ |= empV and σ |= empB
dom(hV ) = {} and dom(hB) = {}
dom(hV ′) = {loc1, ..., locn} ∧ hV ′(loc1) = Je1K(sF , sB ′, [sV
|l1 : loc1, ..., ln : locn], hB ′) ∧ ... ∧ hV ′(loc1) = JenK
(sF , sB
′, [sV |l1 : loc1, ..., ln : locn], hB ′), dom(hB ′) =
{bloc}, hB ′(bloc) = (loc1, ..., locn), and sB ′(b) = bloc
dom(hV ′) = {loc1, ..., locn} ∧ hV ′(loc1) = Je1K(sF , sB ′, [sV
|l1 : m1, ..., ln : mn], hB ′) ∧ ... ∧ hV ′(locn) = JenK(sF , sB ′,
[sV |l1 : m1, ..., ln : mn], hB ′), dom(hB ′) = {bloc}, hB ′(bloc) =
(loc1, ..., locn), and sB ′(b) = bloc, for some m1, ...,mn ∈ Loc
sF , sB
′, sV , hB ′, hV ′ |= ∃l¯.〈l¯ 7→ e¯, b 7→ l¯〉
• Alternative Axiom for Block Allocation (BAalt)
Jb := allocate(e¯)Kσ = (sF , sB [bloc/b], sV , hB [(loc1, ...,
locn)/bloc], [hV |loc1 : Je1Kσ, ..., locn : JenKσ])
where bloc ∈ BLoc−dom(hB) , and loc1, ..., locn ∈ Loc−
dom(hV )
let sB ′ ≡ sB [bloc/b], sB ′′ ≡ sB ′[bloc/b′], hB ′ = hB [(loc1,
..., locn)/bloc] and hV
′ ≡ [hV |loc1 : Je1Kσ, ..., locn : JenKσ],
where bloc ∈ BLoc − dom(hB) , and loc1, ..., locn ∈ Loc −
dom(hV ), as b is not free in e1, ..., en, so we have:
σ |= 〈empV , empB〉
σ |= empV and σ |= empB
dom(hV ) = {} and dom(hB) = {}
sB
′ = bloc and dom(hB) = {bloc}
sB
′′(b) = sB ′[bloc/b′](b) = sB [bloc/b][bloc/b′](b) = bloc,
sB
′′(b′) = sB ′[bloc/b′](b′) = bloc, and dom(hB) = {bloc}
sF , sB
′[bloc/b′], sV , hB ′, hV ′ |= b == b′ ∧ b′ # b′
sF , sB
′[bloc/b′], sV , hB ′, hV ′ |= trueV
sF , sB
′[m/b′], sV , hB ′, hV ′ |= b == b′ ∧ b′ # b′
sF , sB
′[m/b′], sV , hB ′, hV ′ |= trueV for some m ∈ BLoc
sF , sB
′[m/b′], sV , hB ′, hV ′ |= 〈trueV , b == b′ ∧ b′ # b′〉
for some m ∈ BLoc
sF , sB
′, sV , hB ′, hV ′ |= ∃b′.〈trueV , b == b′ ∧ b′ # b′〉
• The Block Content Append form (BCA)
Jappend(bk, e)Kσ = (sF , sB , sV , hB [(loc1, ..., locm,
locm+1)/JbkKσ], [hV |locm+1 : JeKσ])
where hB(JbkKσ) = (loc1, ..., locm), the term of sequence
(loc1, ..., locm) belong to dom(hV ), and locm+1 ∈ Loc −
dom(hV );
let hB
′ ≡ hB [(loc1, ..., locm, locm+1)/JbkKσ] and hV ′ ≡
[hV |locm+1 : JeKσ], where hB(JbkKσ) = (loc1, ..., locm) , and
locm+1 ∈ Loc − dom(hV ), as bk is not free in e1′, ..., em′, e
and #bk does not appear in bk. Note that we can getJbkK(sF , sB , sV , hB ′) from JbkKσ, so we have:
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σ |= ∃l¯′.〈l¯′ # e¯′, bk 7→ l¯′〉
sF , sB , [sV |l1′ : n1, ..., lm′ : nm], hB , hV |= l1′ 7→ e1′ ∗ ...∗
lm
′ 7→ em′ and sF , sB , [sV |l1′ : n1, ..., lm′ : nm], hB , hV |=
bk 7→ (l1′, ..., lm′), for some n1, ..., nm ∈ Loc
dom(hV ) = {n1, ..., nm}, hV (n1) = Je1′K(sF , sB , [sV |l1′ :
n1, ..., lm
′ : nm], hB), ..., hV (nm) = Jem′K(sF , sB , [sV |
l1
′ : n1, ..., lm′ : nm], hB), dom(hB) = {JbkK(sF , sB , [sV |
l1
′ : n1, ..., lm′ : nm], hB)}, hB(JbkK(sF , sB , [sV |l1′ : n1,
..., lm
′ : nm], hB)) = (n1, ..., nm), for some n1, ..., nm ∈ Loc
dom(hV ′) = {n1, ..., nm} ∪ {n}, hV (n1) = Je1′K(sF , sB ,
[sV |l1′ : n1, ..., lm′ : nm, l : n], hB ′), ..., hV (nm) = Jem′K
(sF , sB , [sV |l1′ : n1, ..., lm′ : nm, l : n], hB ′), hV (nm+1) =JeK(sF , sB , [sV |l1′ : n1, ..., lm′ : nm, l : n], hB ′), dom(hB ′) =
{JbkK(sF , sB , [sV |l1′ : n1, ..., lm′ : nm, l : n], hB ′)}, and
hB
′(JbkK(sF , sB , [sV |l1′ : n1, ..., lm′ : nm, l : n], hB ′)) =
(n1, ..., nm, n) for some n1, ..., nm, n ∈ Loc
sF , sB , [sV |l1′ : n1, ..., lm′ : nm, l : n], hB ′, hV ′ |= l¯′ #
e¯′ ∗ l 7→ e and sF , sB , [sV |l1′ : n1, ..., lm′ : nm, l : n], hB ′, hV ′
|= bk 7→ l¯′ · (l) for some n1, ..., nm, n ∈ Loc
sF , sB , sV , hB
′, hV ′ |= ∃l¯′, l.〈l¯′ # e¯′ ∗ l 7→ e, bk 7→ l¯′ · (l)〉
• The Block Content Lookup form (BCL)Jx := {bk.e}Kσ = (sF , sB , sV [hV (loci)/x], hB , hV )
where hB(JbkKσ) = (loc1, ..., locn),JeKσ = i and 1 ≤ i ≤
n;
let sV ′′ ≡ [sV |l1 : n1, ..., lm : nm], sV ′ ≡
sV
′′[hV (loci)/x], where hB(JbkKσ) = (loc1, ..., locn), and
1 ≤ i ≤ n, then:
σ |= ∃l¯.〈x = x′ ∧ e = i ∧ l¯# (e¯|i x′′), bk 7→ l¯〉JxK(sF , sB , sV ′′, hB) = Jx′K(sF , sB , sV ′′, hB), dom(hV ) =
{n1, ..., nm}, hV (n1) = Je1K(sF , sB , sV ′′, hB), ..., hV
(nJeK(sF ,sB,sV ′′,hB)) = Jx′′K(sF , sB , sV ′′, hB), ...,
hV (nm) = JemK(sF , sB , sV ′′, hB), dom(hB) = {JbkK
(sF , sB , sV
′′, hB)}, and hB(JbkK(sF , sB , sV ′′, hB)) =
(n1, ..., nm), for some n1, ..., nm ∈ Loc
dom(hV ) = {n1, ..., nm}, hV (n1) = Je1[x′/x]K(sF , sB , sV ′,
hB), ..., hV (nJe[x′/x]K(sF ,sB,sV ′,hB)) = Jx′′K(sF , sB , sV ′,
hB), ..., hV (nm) = Jem[x′/x]K(sF , sB , sV ′, hB), dom(hB) =
{Jbk[x′/x]K(sF , sB , sV ′, hB)}, and hB(Jbk[x′/x]K(sF , sB ,
sV
′, hB)) = (n1, ..., nm), for some n1, ..., nm ∈ Loc
sF , sB , sV
′, hB , hV |= x = x′′ ∧ e[x′/x] = i ∧ l¯# (e¯[x′/x]
|i x′′) and sF , sB , sV ′, hB , hV |= bk[x′/x] 7→ l¯,
for some n1, ..., nm ∈ Loc
sF , sB , sV
′, hB , hV |= ∃l¯.〈x = x′′ ∧ e[x′/x] = i∧
l¯# (e¯[x′/x]|i x′′), bk[x′/x] 7→ l¯〉
• The Block Address Assignment form (BAA)Jb := bkKσ = (sF , sB [JbkKσ/b], sV , hB , hV )
Let sB ′ ≡ sB [JbkKσ/b], then:
σ |= 〈α, b == b′ ∧ β〉
σ |= α and σ |= b == b′ ∧ β
σ |= α, JbKσ = Jb′Kσ, and σ |= β
sF , sB
′, sV , hB , hV |= α[b′/b] ∧ sB ′(b) = Jbk[b′/b]K
(sF , sB
′, sV , hB) and sF , sB ′, sV , hB , hV |= β[b′/b]
sF , sB
′, sV , hB , hV |= α[b′/b] and
sF , sB
′, sV , hB , hV |= b == bk[b′/b] ∧ β[b′/b]
sF , sB
′, sV , hB , hV |= 〈α[b′/b], b == bk[b′/b] ∧ β[b′/b]〉
• The Block Address Assignment form (BAAalt)Jb := f.iKσ = (sV , sB [Jf.iKσ/b], sF , hB , hV )
Let sB ′ ≡ sB [Jf.iKσ/b], then:
σ |= 〈#f2 = i− 1 ∧ α, f = f2 · b′ · f3 ∧ β〉
σ |= #f2 = i− 1 ∧ α and σ |= f = f2 · b′ · f3 ∧ βJ#f2Kσ = Ji− 1Kσ, σ |= α, JfKσ = Jf2 · b′ · f3Kσ, and σ |= βJbK(sF , sB ′, sV , hB , hV ) = Jb′K(sF , sB ′, sV , hB , hV )J#f2K(sF , sB ′, sV , hB , hV ) = Ji− 1K(sF , sB ′, sV , hB , hV ),
(sF , sB
′, sV , hB , hV ) |= α, JfK(sF , sB ′, sV , hB , hV ) =Jf2 · b′ · f3K(sF , sB ′, sV , hB , hV ), and (sF , sB ′, sV , hB , hV ) |= β
sF , sB
′, sV , hB , hV |= #f2 = i− 1 ∧ α and
sF , sB
′, sV , hB , hV |= f = f2 · b′ · f3 ∧ b == b′ ∧ β
sF , sB
′, sV , hB , hV |= 〈#f2 = i− 1 ∧ α,
f = f2 · b′ · f3 ∧ b == b′ ∧ β〉
• The Block Address Replacement of a File form (BARF)Jf.e := bkKσ = (sF [(bloc1, ..., JbkKσ, ..., blocn)/f ], sB , sV ,
hB , hV )
where sF (f) = (bloc1, ..., bloci, ..., blocn),JeKσ = i and
1 ≤ i ≤ n
Let sF ′ ≡ sF [(bloc1, ..., JbkKσ, ..., blocn)/f ], then:
σ |= 〈#f2 = e− 1 ∧ α, f = f2 · bk′ · f3 ∧ β〉
σ |= #f2 = e− 1 ∧ α and σ |= f = f2 · bk′ · f3 ∧ βJ#f2Kσ = Je− 1Kσ, σ |= α, JfKσ = Jf2 · bk′ · f3Kσ, and σ |= βJf.eK(sF ′, sB , sV , hB , hV ) = JbkK(sF ′, sB , sV , hB , hV )J#f2K(sF ′, sB , sV , hB , hV ) = Je− 1K(sF ′, sB , sV , hB , hV ),
(sF
′, sB , sV , hB , hV ) |= α and JfK(sF ′, sB , sV , hB , hV ) =Jf2 · bk · f3K(sF ′, sB , sV , hB , hV ) and (sF ′, sB , sV , hB , hV ) |= β
sF , sB
′, sV , hB , hV |= #f2 = e− 1 ∧ α and
sF , sB
′, sV , hB , hV |= f = f2 · bk · f3 ∧ β
sF , sB
′, sV , hB , hV |= 〈#f2 = i− 1 ∧ α,
f = f2 · b′ · f3 ∧ b == b′ ∧ β〉
• Block Deletion form (BD)Jdelete bKσ = (sF , sB , sV , hBe(dom(hB)−{JbKσ}), hV )
let hB
′ ≡ hBe(dom(hB)− {JbKσ}), then:
σ |= ∃l¯.〈l¯# −, b 7→ l¯〉
dom(hV ) = {n1, ..., nm} and hV (n1) = −, ..., hV (nm) = − and
dom(hB) = {JbKσ} and hB(JbKσ) = (n1, ..., nm),
for some n1, ..., nm ∈ Loc
dom(hV ) = {n1, ..., nm} and hV (n1) = −, ..., hV (nm) = − and
dom(hB ′) = {JbKσ} − {JbKσ} = {} for some n1, ..., nm ∈ Loc
sF , sB , [sV |l1 : n1, ..., lm : nm], hB ′, hV |= l1 7→ − ∗ ... ∗ lm 7→ −
and sF , sB , [sV |l1 : n1, ..., lm : nm], hB ′, hV |= empB ,
for some n1, ..., nm ∈ Loc
sF , sB , sV , hB
′, hV |= ∃l¯.〈l¯# −, empB〉
